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BEYONDSURVWAL: THEPROCREAT~ 
RIGHTS OF WOMEN WITH HIV 
KATHRYN BOOCKVAR* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Increasingly, women's autonomy over their bodies is being threat-
ened as courts and legislatures play paternalistic roles. Women have 
been forced to have surgical procedures against their will, often to the 
detriment of their health.! They have been forced into temporary2 or 
permanent3 sterilization, and have been prosecuted for child abuse or 
neglect for having taken improper care during pregnancy.4 Courts have 
even permitted women to be sued by their children for allegedly 
negligent actions during pregnancy.5 
None of this is entirely surprising in light of the history of pater-
nalistic attitudes toward women and especially toward women's birth-
* ].0., American University, Washington College of Law; B.A., University of Pennsylvania. Ms. 
Boockvar was a founding member of the AMERICAN UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF GENDER AND THE 
LAw. 
I These procedures are most often imposed in the name of protecting a fetus. Physicians and 
courts have ordered women to receive caesarian sections, blood transfusions and full life su pport 
systems, despite the objections of the women or their families. See infra note 137 and accompa-
nying text. 
2 Recently, Norplant has been used as a means of temporarily sterilizing women considered 
to be incapable of effective parenting. See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text. 
3 Compelled sterilizations to prevent reproduction by those considered unfit were prevalent 
earlier in the century, and are still performed today. See infra notes 20-28 and accompanying 
text. 
4 See, e.g., People v. Stewart, No. M 508197 (San Diego Mun. Ct. 1987); GEORGE]' ANNAS ET 
AL., AMERICAN HEALTH LAw 978 (1990) (describing the case of Pamela Rae Stewart, who was 
charged under California law with the "willful omission of 'necessary clothing, food, shelter or 
medical attendance'" from her fetus) (citations omitted). The state alleged that Ms. Stewart 
disregarded her doctor's advice by failing to maintain bedrest, participating in sexual intercourse, 
continuing to actively care for her other two children and not reporting to the hospital quickly 
enough after she experienced vaginal bleeding. These actions were alleged to have resulted in 
the death of her baby. Id. 
S See, e.g., Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869, 871 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (recognizing a claim 
by a child against his mother for taking tetracycline during her pregnancy, allegedly causing the 
discoloration of the child's teeth). But see Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 356 (Ill. 1988) 
(refusing to allow a fetus to bring a legal action against its mother for negligent actions during 
pregnancy). See generally Dawn E. Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's 
Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YAt.E LJ. 599, 605-07 (1986) 
(discussing the frightening consequences of the potential extension of tort liability to mothers 
for actions or inactions during pregnancy). 
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ing roles.6 However, new avenues for potential control over women's 
bodies arise continually, and the AIDS crisis and its increasing impact 
on women have created a renewed fear. 
Women are rapidly becoming the fastest growing population of 
people with HIV.7 Inevitably, the number of infants with the disease is 
increasing as well.8 These statistics and the intensity of society's nega-
tive perceptions of AIDS might provide adequate incentive for states 
to make women infected with HIV / AIDS their next "victims" of pro-
creative control. No state has yet forbidden women with HIV / AIDS 
from bearing children or prosecuted them for doing so. This prospect 
does not seem unlikely, however, considering the history of state at-
tempts to control reproduction by persons considered unfit or unable 
to make "appropriate" parenting decisions themselves.9 
This is not a paranoid concern. Women have been screened for 
diseases such as syphilis, Tay-Sachs disease, and sickle-cell anemia be-
fore bearing a child. lO Currently, several states have implemented pre-
6 For a comprehensive discussion of the treatment of women as birthing vessels, see GENA 
COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES FROM ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 
TO ARTIFICIAL WOMBS (1985). 
7 See Nan D. Hunter, Complications of Gender: Women and HIV Disease, in AIDS AGENDA: 
EMERGING ISSUES IN CIVIL RIGHTS 5, 5 (Nan D. Hunter & William B. Rubenstein eds., 1992) 
[hereinafter AIDS AGENDA] (citing estimates that HIV is currently spreading at a quicker rate 
among women than men, and that by 1994, each year more women than gay men will be 
diagnosed with AIDS) (citations omitted); see also CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV / AIDS 
PREVENTION: FACTS ABOUT WOMEN AND HIV / AIDS (1993) (stating that in the United States, 
AIDS cases among women increased 17%, while cases among men increased 4% between 1990 
and 1991). 
8 See Taunya L. Banks, Women and AIDS-Racism, Sexism, and Classism, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
Soc. CHANGE 351, 353 (1989-90) (citing estimates that about 80% of women with AIDS are of 
childbearing age, and that approximately 75% of pediatric AIDS cases occur as a result of 
perinatal exposure to HIV) (citations omitted). 
9 Several legal and medical commentators have discussed the potentially imminent threat to 
the right of women with HIV to bear children. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 7, at 16-30 (discussing 
the possible means by which states could control childbearing by women with HIV / AIDS); Scott 
H. Isaacman, Are We Outlawing Motherhood for HIV-Infected Women?, 22 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 479 
(1991) (arguing that Illinois' criminal HIV transmission statute could be used to prosecute 
women for perinatal transmission); Michael L. Closen & Scott H. Isaacman, Criminally Pregnant: 
Are AIDS-Transmission Laws Encouraging Abortion?, 76 A.BA. J. 76 (December 1990) (question-
ing whether state criminal HIV transmission statutes encourage abortions by HIV-infected women, 
and whether this deterrent to childbearing violates these women's constitutional rights). 
10 See Katherine L. Acuff & Ruth F. Faden, A History of Prenatal and Newborn Screening 
Programs: Lessons for the Future, in AIDS, WOMEN AND THE NEXT GENERATION: TOWARDS A 
MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PUBLIC POLICY FOR HIV TESTING OF PREGNANT WOMEN AND NEWBORNS 
59,59-93 (Ruth R. Faden et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter NEXT GENERATION] (describing numer-
ous state screening programs implemented during the last century); see also infra notes 134-62 
and accompanying text. 
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natal screening programs for HIVY If states are prosecuting pregnant 
women for fetus abuse or the "delivery" of drugs to their infants,12 
might they not also prosecute women for exposing their fetuses or 
newborns to the AIDS virus, which could also result in serious prob-
lems for the infant?13 If states are prosecuting people with HIV for 
reckless endangerment, attempted murder, or transmission of HIV to 
another individual,14 who can say that states will not institute such 
prosecutions against women who expose a fetus or newborn to HIV? 
As mentioned above, no provisions explicitly preventing women 
with HIV / AIDS from bearing children have yet been enacted. There 
are many ways, however, by which society might eventually attempt to 
legally prevent women with HIV from procreating. 
Part II of this Article discusses women's lack of control over their 
bodies and their procreative ability. It first addresses society's control 
over women's reproduction from a preventative perspective, with a 
focus on compelled sterilizations to preclude childbearing ability alto-
gether. It then discusses the current trend in the law toward after-the-
fact punishment, intended to deter particular women from deciding 
to bear children. Finally, it addresses two aspects of a potential, but 
unwelcome, future: first, the extension of child abuse/neglect statutes 
to prosecute women with HIV / AIDS for becoming pregnant; and 
second, the possible application of criminal HIV transmission statutes 
to prosecute the perinatal exposure or transfer of HIV.15 
II See Banks, supra note 8, at 358 (reporting that Delaware and Tennessee require prenatal 
HIV tests, and that several other states employ testing under particular circumstances) (citations 
omitted). 
12 See infra notes 41-53 and accompanying text 
13 Of babies born infected with HIV, approximately 75% will exhibit symptoms by the time 
they are two years old. Nancy E. Kass, Reproductive Decision Making in the Context of HIV: The 
Case far Nondirective Counseling, in NEXT GENERATION, supra note 10, at 308, 310. These symp-
toms may include growth failure, various bacterial infections, neurologic abnormalities, certain 
pneumonias, and organ abnormalities. John Modlin & Alfred Saah, Public Health and Clinical 
Aspects of HIV Infection and Disease in Women and Children in the United States, in NEXT GENERA-
TION, supra note 10, at 29,43-47. 
Fetuses and children exposed to drugs such as cocaine or heroin in utero may be spontane-
ously aborted, or may exhibit addiction, strokes, low birth weight, small size, low IQ scores, 
moodiness, urological malformations, less mother-child bonding, brain lesions, and learning 
disabilities. Julia Elizabeth Jones, Comment, State Intervention in Pregnancy, 52 LA. L. REv. 1159, 
1161...{i2 (1992); see also In reDustin T., 614 A.2d 999,1002 (Md. 1992). 
On the other hand, whereas approximately 350,000 to 739,000 infants are exposed to at least 
one illegal drug in utero each year,Jones, supra, at 1160...{il, as of December 1991, there had been 
a total of 3471 cases of AIDS reported in children under 13 years old. CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL, HIV / AIDS SURVEILLANCE: YEAR-END EDITION (1992). 
14 See infra notes 55-79 and accompanying text 
15 This Article will discuss the exposure to and transmission of HIV from a woman to her 
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Part III of this Article explains why women should not and must 
not be screened, prosecuted, or punished for perinatal HN exposure 
under any of the above-mentioned statutes. It explains the ways in 
which these statutes violate women's constitutional rights ofliberty and 
privacy, and work against practical public policy. Part III concludes by 
offering more appropriate and less restrictive means for accomplishing 
the governmental goals espoused. 
II. WOMEN'S HISTORICAL LACK OF CONTROL 
OVER THEIR PROCREATION 
Conception takes place in the woman's body. Any potential life 
develops within the woman's body. It is the woman's body that deter-
mines when that potential life will enter the world. Yet, society has 
historically devised and implemented means to deprive a woman of 
control over her reproductive operations, and our laws and customs 
continue to do this. The following subparts discuss medical and legal 
practices used to punish or restrict individuals considered to be unfit 
or undesirable parents. Also specifically addressed are child abuse and 
neglect statutes and HN transmission and exposure statutes, and how 
they might be applied to women of childbearing age with HN / AIDS. 
A. The Goal of Preventing "Imperfect" Offspring 
Given the present power structure, the real question is: Should the 
machine (the woman) be the one to decide whether, or how often, 
or with what materials, it goes into production? Obviously not.16 
Women have long been viewed and treated as breeding ma-
chines-vessels or containers for a fetus which then goes on to become 
a baby, and with any luck a quality productP Numerous statesmen, 
geneticists, biologists, and others have contended that women should 
not have an automatic right to have a child; rather, consideration 
should be given to the mother's genetic makeup and social desirabil-
ity.ls Some have even questioned whether women are the best vessels 
fetus. The expressions "perinatal," "vertical," and "in utero" transmission or exposure will be used 
to describe the circumstances surrounding the movement of HIV between mother and infant 
during pregnancy or childbirth. 
16 COREA, supra note 6, at 27. 
17 See id. at 17, 28, 250, 299 (discussing the treatment of women's parenting role as a 
procedure directed by men, by which women's bodies are used to contain and deliver the fetus 
for the purpose of creating desirable human beings). 
18 See id. at 19, 25, 28-29 (quoting many eugenicists, including reform school ad' linistrator 
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for better babies, or whether glass containers might provide a safer 
haven.19 
United States law has sometimes reflected and sometimes rejected 
these positions in its evolving stance on forced sterilizations.2o In the 
first half of this century, it is estimated that as many as 45,000 Ameri-
cans were legally compelled to be sterilized.21 These sterilizations were 
performed primarily on the poor, the mentally ill, the disabled, and 
on criminals. 22 They had the greatest impact on people of color.23 
In order to serve the above-mentioned goals of reproductive "qual-
ity," the medical industry has attempted to exert control by performing 
operations resulting in reduced sexuality and sexual drive or full ster-
ilization, often without the informed consent of the patient. Doctors 
have removed women's ovaries, breasts, and clitorides in the name of 
Moya Woodside; optometrist and author Robert K. Graham; Nobel prize winner Dr. William 
Shockley; one of the discoverers of DNA's structure, Francis Crick; and biochemist Norman W. 
Pirie). To facilitate this "appropriate mother" selection process, various means have been hypothe-
sized, including parent licensing schemes, taxing strategies and mandatory temporary steriliza-
tions to be reversed only upon government approval. Id. at 28-29. 
The basic aims of these theories reflect many of the same ideals of German Nazism: to 
improve the human race and produce "better" human beings through reproductive control, 
which often means weeding out those "inferior" by race. class, and physical and mental condition. 
Id. at 17. 
19 COREA, supra note 6, at 250-53. 
Fetuses may someday be safer in an artificial womb than in a woman's body, which 
does not sufficiently protect them from teratogens-agents that could cause de-
fects .... Labor is dangerous for babies. Some contractions of the womb can be too 
hard and long and can actually "batter" the baby. Some argue that the artificial 
womb would eliminate birth trauma. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
20 See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (holding that a statute authorizing the 
sterilization of "mental defectives" was permissible, because" [t] hree generations of imbeciles are 
enough"); Estate ofC.W., No. 2970, 1993 Pa. Super. LEXIS 857, at *10-11 (Sup. Ct. Pa. Mar. 17, 
1993), vacated and petition fur reargument granted. But see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 
(1942) (holding that a statute authorizing the sterilization of certain criminals violates Equal 
Protection Clause, and that such legislation triggers strict scrutiny because it involves the funda-
mental right of procreation. The majority in Skinner stated that "[t]he power to sterilize, if 
exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can 
cause races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear." Id.; see 
also Estate of c.w., 1993 Pa. Super. LEXIS at *8-12 (stating that the United States has a "long 
history of eugenic sterilization of the mentally retarded," and holding that mentally disabled 
people have a fundamental right to privacy and procreation requiring that any contraceptive 
measures sought be the least restrictive possible). 
21 In the 1920s, most states permitted forced sterilization "to control population among 
'socially unfit' people." Editorial, Don't Use Norplant Against Welfare Mothers, USA TODAY, Febru-
ary 16, 1993, at lOA; Barbara Kantrowitz & Pat Wingert, The NurplantDebate, NEWSWEEK, February 
15, 1993, at 36 (citing Dr. Allan Rosenfield, Dean of Columbia University School of Public 
Health). 
22 Editorial, supra note 21; Kantrowitz & Wingert, supra note 21. 
23 Editorial, supra note 21; Kantrowitz & Wingert, supra note 21. 
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healing certain neuroses, cancers,24 nymphomania, "troublesomeness, 
menstrual cramps, attempted suicide, cussedness and erotic tenden-
cies."25 
Sterilization is performed most often on women of color, particu-
larly those who are poor.26 Many women are not asked for consent at 
all, or are pressured by their doctors to consent to these operations. 
Between 1971 and 1974, Mexican-American women in Los Angeles 
sued a public hospital, alleging that their doctors had compelled their 
consent to sterilization while they were in active labor, by "(1) with-
holding medication, (2) not informing women that the procedure was 
permanent, or (3) pressuring some husbands to sign consent forms 
after their wives refused. "27 
As a more recent demonstration of coerced sterilization, several 
years ago a Latina woman with AIDS was offered a free abortion (which 
she wanted but could not afford), but only on the condition that she 
consent to a tuballigation.28 In addition, the arrival and availability of 
Norplant29 have created similar sterilization issues. There have been 
numerous accounts of women being compelled to have Norplant in-
serted as a condition of plea bargains or probation.30 Furthermore, in 
24Potential cancers are often cited as a reason for hysterectomies (removal of the uterus), 
oophorectomies (removal of the ovary) and mastectomies (removal of the breast). Yet statistics 
indicate that the risk of death is higher for hysterectomy operations than it is for uterine cancer. 
COREA, supra note 6, at 308 n.8 (citation omitted). Furthermore, some doctors have asserted that 
"if prophylactic hysterectomies were performed on one million women, the average gain in life 
expectancy would be about two months, 'or about the time it takes to go through the operation 
and convalescence.'" Id. (citations omitted). 
25Id. at 307-10 (citations omitted). 
26 See Banks, supra note 8, at 362 (stating that 43% of federally funded sterilizations are 
conducted on African-American women). Banks also reports that in 1981, a study found that 65% 
of Puerto Rican women in Hartford, Connecticut and 55% percent of Latina women in 
Springfield, Massachusetts had been sterilized. Id. at 362 (citations omitted). 
27Id. at 362-63 (citing Carlos G. Velez-Ibanez, The Nonconsenting Sterilization of Mexican 
Women in Los Angeles, in TWICE A MINORITY: MEXICAN-AMERICAN WOMEN 235, 240, 242 (Mar-
garita B. Melville ed., 1980)). The federal court judge found in favor of the defendant hospital 
and physicians, holding that the language barriers between the doctors and the women led the 
doctors to believe the women were consenting. Id. (citing Madrigal v. Quilligan, No. CV 75-2057 
]WC, slip op. at 6 (C.D. Cal. June 30,1978)). 
28Banks, supra note 8, at 363 (citing Abraham, Pregnant Women Face AIDS Dilemma, AM. 
MED. NEWS,July 22,1988, at 35). 
29 Norplant is a contraceptive designed to prevent pregnancy for up to five years. It is made 
of a synthetic hormone which is implanted into the woman's arm, allowing small amounts of the 
hormone to be released slowly. Kantrowitz & Wingert, supra note 21. Norplant was approved by 
the FDA in 1990. Id. 
30 See, e.g., ACLU Challenges Narplant Order, UPI, March 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, UPI File (reporting that a county judge in McLean, Illinois, sentenced 22-year-old Lisa 
Smith to have five-year Norplant implanted as part of a plea bargain resulting from her admitted 
abuse of her son); Birth Control Implant Order is Appealed, L.A. TIMES, February 2, 1991, at B18 
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the last two years, thirteen states have proposed Norplant-related leg-
islation.31 
The law is not acting alone in its move to coerce the use of 
Norplant; the medical and pharmaceutical industries are acting with 
much of the same compulsion toward reproductive control. It is some-
times not divulged to potential recipients that Norplant removal, as 
well as insertion, will result in some financial expense to them.32 Many 
women have complained that they were urged to try Norplant despite 
their reservations, that they were not fully informed about potential 
side effects, and that their doctors discouraged them or refused to 
perform the procedure for removal of the implant when requested. 33 
As is usually the case with compelled sterilization, the impact of 
coerced Norplant insertion has been overwhelmingly felt by women of 
color, and has raised questions of racial eugenics and social control. 
For example, numerous complaints have been made by Native Ameri-
can women asserting that clinicians have coerced them to have Nor-
plant inserted, or to keep it in once it was already implanted.34 Many 
Hispanic women have felt the same pressures and have reported that 
some health clinics distribute Norplant pamphlets in Spanish only, with 
none in English.35 Numerous Mrican Americans have analogized the 
(noting that a superior court judge in Tulare, California included Norplant implantation as a 
condition of probation for 27-year-old Darlene Johnson, a convicted child abuser). 
Other courts have ordered women to refrain from becoming pregnant as a condition of 
probation, although they have often been overruled on appeal. See, e.g., Kansas v. Mosburg, 768 
P.2d 313, 315 (Kan. 1989) (prohibiting the sentencing judge's use of this probation requirement 
because the condition "unduly intrude[d]" on the defendant's constitutional right to privacy) 
(citing People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 
2d 7, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1337 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1976». 
31 Kantrowitz & Wingert, supra note 21 (citing information compiled by the Alan Guttmacher 
Institute). Several of these legislative efforts have included requiring or providing financial 
encouragement to women on governmental support to be implanted with Norplant.!d. (describ-
ing bills proposed in Tennessee and Mississippi as examples). 
32 Norplant costs about $365, plus approximately $200 to have it inserted. Kantrowitz & 
Wingert, supra note 21. It costs at least $100 to $150 to have the implant removed. Id.; Sally 
Jacobs, Norplant Draws Concerns Over Risks, Coercion, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 21, 1992, at 1. 
Although Medicaid does cover costs for Norplant insertion, it will not pay for its removal, even 
if the woman experiences negative side effects. Darrell Dawsey, Norplant Just a Way to Control, 
DETROIT NEWS, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 5, 1993. 
33 See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 32 (reporting disturbing stories of women's experiences with 
Norplant). 
34Jacobs, supra note 32 (citing information given by Charon Asetoyer, Director of the Native 
American Women's Health Education Resource Center in South Dakota). 
35Id. (citing statements made by Luz Alvarez Martinez, Director of the National Latina 
Health Organization in Oakland, California). 
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effects of compelled Norplant insertion (via public assistance, inner-
city clinics, and schools) to attempted genocide.36 
B. After-the-Fact Punishment: Application of Child Abuse and HN 
Transmission Statutes to Perinatal Transfer of HN 
There are two recent movements in the law which threaten to add 
yet another avenue for constraining the childbearing autonomy of 
women, particularly women with HIV / AIDS. This subpart first dis-
cusses the trend of applying child abuse and neglect statutes to preg-
nant women and their fetuses. Although no state has yet prosecuted a 
woman for child abuse or neglect for perinatally exposing a child to 
HIV, states have employed these abuse and neglect statutes to prose-
cute women who use illicit drugs during pregnancy. Because of the 
similar perceptions of blame and disgust attached to drug dependency 
and AIDS, numerous medical and legal workers fear that these abuse 
and neglect statutes will be extended to cover the transmission of HIV 
from mother to child. 
The second section of this subpart will address the numerous 
criminal HIV transmission statutes enacted by states in the last decade. 
Although no states have yet applied these statutes to pregnant women 
and their fetuses, many of the statutes are broadly drawn, leaving room 
for the possibility of prosecution and punishment of women for the 
perinatal transfer of HIV. 
1. Prosecution for Child Abuse, Neglect, or Delivery of Drugs 
The war on drugs has injured many more than it has helped, and 
most of the wounded have been poor women of color. One of the 
harshest battles has been fought on the procreation front, where drug-
using women have been branded unfit to mother. Rather than working 
to help these women conquer their addiction, giving them education 
in parenting, or trying to instill hope and motivation to break cycles 
of addiction, society has deemed punishment to be the best response. 37 
36 Kantrowitz & Wingert, supra note 21 (quoting Melvin Tuggle, a black Baltimore minister: 
"One third of us are in jail and another third is killing us and now they're taking away the 
babies .... If the community, the churches and our white brothers don't stand up for us, there 
won't be any of us left."); Dawsey, supra note 32 ("Once again, it's on, black America. The United 
States is stepping up its war on poor people of color-in particular, low-income sisters. The latest 
bullet aimed at poor black women is Norplant .... "). 
37The United States General Accounting Office has determined that pregnant women with 
drug and alcohol problems encounter many barriers in trying to access basic health care services. 
CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE LAw & POLICY, PuNISHING WOMEN FOR THEIR BEHAVIOR DURING 
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Rather than increasing the resources and efforts available to expand 
substance abuse treatment and prevention, states have focused on 
prosecuting and penalizing these women under the rubric of fetal 
abuse and neglect, and "delivery" of controlled substances to their 
newborns. 38 
Many professionals in the medical, legal, and scientific fields be-
lieve that women who use illicit drugs, sexual partners of drug users, 
and others with the potential to bear or raise "defective" offspring, 
should not have an automatic right to bear children.39 This conviction 
is generally grounded in blame constructs and disdainful beliefs, and 
it prevents these women from being viewed with compassion and 
support. The current trend of prosecuting drug-using women reflects 
these perceptions of blame and disgust, as many courts order children 
PREGNANCY: A PUBLIC HEALTH DISASTER 2 (1993) (citing UNITED SATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE: REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, U.S. SENATE, DRUG-EXPOSED 
INFANTS, A GENERATION AT RISK (1990». 
Women, and especially pregnant women, have also had difficulty accessing appropriate 
substance abuse programs where they have been able to access such programs at all. See id. at 
2-3 (describing a study finding that approximately 54% of New York City substance abuse 
programs refuse to treat pregnant women, 67% did not accept pregnant women on Medicaid, 
and 87% refused to treat crack-addicted pregnant women) (citing Wendy Chavkin, Drug Addiction 
and Pregnancy: Policy Crossroads, 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 483, 483-87 (1990»); OFFICE OF NA-
TIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, BREAKING THE CYCLE OF DRUG ABUSE: 1993 INTERIM NATIONAL 
DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 8 (1993) (only 10% of pregnant woman in need of substance abuse 
treatment actually receive such treatment). 
38 See, e.g., In re Dustin T., 614 A.2d 999, 1001 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992), cert. denied,620 
A.2d 350 (Md. 1993) (affirming finding of child abuse because of mother's drug use before and 
during pregnancy); In reValerie D., 613 A.2d 748, 758-69 (Conn. 1992) (reversing judgment of 
neglect based on prenatal cocaine use); Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1296 (Fla. 1992) 
(reversing conviction for drug delivery to a minor of a mother who took cocaine shortly before 
childbirth); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 713 (Ohio 1992) (dismissing child endangerment 
charges against woman addicted to cocaine during pregnancy); Welch v. Commonwealth, No. 
90-CA-1l89-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 1992) (reversing child abuse conviction of woman who 
allegedly used drugs during pregnancy), afJ'd 1993 Ky. LEXIS 128 (Sept. 30, 1993); People v. 
Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50,53 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (drug delivery statute does not apply to woman 
using drugs during pregnancy), appeal denied, 437 Mich. 1046 (1991), amended, 471 N.W.2d 619; 
In re Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. 869, 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (finding neglect for the prenatal drug 
use of the mother); State v. Bremer, No. 90-32227-FH (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 1991) (dismissing 
drug delivery charges against mother for ingestion of cocaine during pregnancy); Department 
of Soc. Servs. v. Felicia B., 543 N.Y.S.2d 637, 638 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1989) (if child is born with a 
positive toxicology for illicit drugs, mother may be found guilty of neglect); In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 
935,939 (1986) (holding that abuse may be based on prenatal conduct by the mother). 
39 Banks, supra note 8, at 361; see also id. at 372-73 (comparing beliefs of certain geneticists 
and others that women with the potential to give birth to "genetically defective" babies should 
not be granted reproductive autonomy); COREA, supra note 6, at 28-29 (discussing beliefs that 
social desirability and gene pools should be taken into account to determine a woman's right to 
bear children). 
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to be placed in the custody of foster parents rather than in the arms 
of their natural mothers.40 
In the cases utilizing child abuse and neglect statutes to prosecute 
drug-using women, courts have often focused on the past, giving little 
in the way of second chances.4l Even when mothers have tried to 
recover from drug addiction and resume care for their children, courts 
have denied custody based on past conduct.42 Indeed, at least one court 
has held that so long as the mother has at some point "merely placed 
[the child] at risk of significant harm," the court may find neglect or 
abuse.43 If this standard is upheld, a court could decide that a woman 
with HIV / AIDS places a child "at risk of significant harm" simply by 
becoming pregnant, considering that an estimated 7 to 40% of infants 
born to HIV-infected women develop their own seropositivity.44 Fur-
ther, in light of the courts' emphases on the past, if a woman with 
HIV / AIDS has ever used drugs or participated in other "disapproved" 
behaviors, the likelihood of her prosecution may be even greater. 
In making judgments to take children away from women who use 
illicit drugs, states have also employed statutes proscribing the delivery 
of drugs to minors. Johnson v. State,45 is probably the best known 
opinion on this matter. Johnson held that Florida's statute criminalizing 
"deliver[y of] any controlled substance to a person under the age of 
18 years"46 applied to the transmission of cocaine from a mother to her 
40 See, e.g., Dustin T., 614 A.2d at 1001 (denying appeal by a former drug-using mother to 
regain custody of her child); In re Stephen w., 271 Cal. Rptr. 319, 320 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) 
(placing child in foster care because of its positive test for drugs at birth); Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. 
at 874 (holding that an infant should be in foster care because mother's drug use was indicative 
of probability of future neglect); Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 938 (allowing the state to take custody of a 
child judged to have been neglected in utero). 
41 See, e.g., Dustin T., 614 A.2d at 1003 ("[W]e believe that the [Montgomery County 
Department of Social Services] has a right-and indeed a duty-to look at the track record, the 
past, of [the mother] in order to predict what her future U'eatment of the child may be"). 
42 See, e.g., id. at 1003-04 (affirming placement of a child in foster care, even though the 
mother had not taken drugs for a month and was desperately trying to remain drug-free); see 
also In reWilliam B., 533 A.2d 16,19 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (parent's treatment of one child 
may be used to evaluate how another child will be treated), cert. denied, 537 A.2d 272 (Md. 1988). 
43 Dustin T., 614 A.2d at 1003. 
44 See J.C. Melchor et aI., Vertical Transmission of HIV, 5 J. AIDS 529, 534 (1992) (reporting 
research finding approximately 13% are infected, and suggesting that because many infants are 
born seropositive but later seroconvert, an eighteen-month waiting period be followed before 
children are determined to be HlV infected); Modlin & Saah, supra note 13, at 41 n.56 (citing 
statistics of 7 to 33%); C.C. Prober & A.A. Gershon, Medical Management of Newborns and Infants 
Born to Human Immunodeficiency Virus-Seropositive Mothers, 10 J. PEDIATRIC INFECTIOUS DISEASE 
684 (1991) (quoting the transmission figure as 15 to 30%); M.L. Stuber, Children, Adolescents, 
and AIDS, 9 PSYCHIATRIC MED. 441 (1991) (estimating 25 to 40%). 
45 578 So. 2d 419,420 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992). 
46FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.13(1)(c) (West 1989). 
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newborn after birth and before the cutting of the umbilical cordY The 
court focused on its interpretation of the statutory language to the 
exclusion of legislative intent.48 The majority stated that logic com-
pelled them to find that the statute clearly applied to the defendant's 
situation: 
Appellant voluntarily took cocaine into her body, knowing it 
would pass to her fetus and knowing (or should have known) 
[sic] that birth was imminent. She is deemed to know that an 
infant at birth is a person, and a minor, and that delivery of 
cocaine to the infant is illegal. We can reach no other con-
clusion 10gically.49 
This interpretation was chosen even though the legislature had 
discussed previously whether it wished to criminalize the perinatal 
transmission of illegal drugs, and had explicitly decided not to do 
SO.50 
More enlightened courts have recently overturned convictions of 
drug-using women because of a lack of legislative intent to apply such 
statutes in these circumstances or evidence of contrary intent.51 These 
cases have held that child abuse or neglect statutes, and statutes pro-
hibiting drug delivery to a minor, were not intended to cover the 
transmission of drugs from a mother to her fetus or newborn. Courts 
should also take this approach to legislative omissions should cases 
arise that invite the application of these statutes to perinatal HIV 
transmission. 
As states all over the country have instigated these prosecutions, 
however, some commentators have expressed apprehension about the 
potential scope of the reasoning used. There is concern that states will 
decide explicitly that drug users and other women are unfit parents, 
and will look for ways to deny the right of these women to bear 
47 johnson, 578 So. 2d at 419. 
48Id. 
49Id. at 420. 
50Id. at 423-24 (Sharp, J.. dissenting). 
51 See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1297 (Fla. 1992) (drug delivery statute not 
intended to apply to time between a child's birth and cutting of umbilical cord, or to in utero 
transmission), revg578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 713 
(Ohio 1992) (child endangerment statute does not apply before the child was born); Welch v. 
Commonwealth, No. 90-CA-1189-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 1992) (criminal abuse statute does not 
cover drug use during pregnancy); State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140, 1142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1991) (child abuse statute does not apply to fetuses); People v. Morabito, 580 N.YS.2d 843, 847 
(N.Y City Ct. 1992) (welfare endangerment statute does not apply to unborn child). 
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children. 52 The prosecution of these women for fetal abuse or neglect 
would essentially preclude them from being able to procreate. Because 
of the threat that any children born would be removed, 53 women would 
be forced to refrain from childbearing. 
The trend of punishing society-designated unfitness could be ex-
tended to women with HIV / AIDS, especially in light of society's un-
sympathetic perception of AIDS. AIDS is viewed as a disease involving 
fault, guilt, and irresponsibility. A substantial portion of the public 
regards HIV infection as a stigma-a mark of disgrace and shame.54 
Because of this societal prejudice, and because AIDS is perceived as a 
"death sentence," most people would not be sympathetic to the desires 
of women with HIV / AIDS to have children. As will be discussed below, 
however, the right to have children is a fundamental right, and it 
cannot be denied merely because of societal disapproval. 
2. Prosecution for HIV Transmission or Exposure 
States have generally prosecuted individuals for HIV transmission 
or exposure in two ways: they have tried to fit such actions under 
traditional criminal statutes, and they have created statutes specifically 
for that purpose. 
a. Use of traditional criminal statutes 
Soon after the appearance of AIDS, states began to employ al-
ready-existing criminal statutes to prosecute individuals for criminal 
exposure to or transmission of HIV.55 Individuals have been prosecuted 
for numerous criminal offenses, including reckless endangerment, 
52 Presumably, states could amend their child abuse and neglect statutes to express their 
intentions of reaching fetal abuse via illegal drugs or HN transmission. Such statutes, however, 
would be unconstitutional violations of women's rights of liberty and privacy. See supra notes 
109-208 and accompanying text. 
53Many child abuse and neglect statutes provide for temporary or permanent removal of 
such children from the custody of parents committing the alleged abuse or neglect. See infra note 
127; see also Jones, supra note 13, at 1164; Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood: Feminist Theury and 
State Regulation of Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1325, 1330 (1990). 
54 See, e.g., Charles E. Rosenberg, Disease and Social Order in America: Perceptions and Expec-
tations, in AIDS: THE BURDENS OF HISTORY 12, 28 (Elizabeth Fee et al. eds., 1988) ("The social 
response to AIDS ... reminds us that we live in a fragmented society. To a substantial minority 
of Americans ... [AIDS is] a deserved punishment for the sexual transgressor; the unchecked 
growth of deviance was a symptom of a more fundamental social disorder."); Allen M. Brandt, 
AIDS: From Social History to Social Policy, in AIDS: THE BURDENS OF HISTORY, supra, at 147, 155 
(1988) ("Some have seen the AIDS epidemic in a purely 'moral' light: AIDS is a disease that 
occurs among those who violate the moral order."). 
55 See Michael I. Leonard, Combatting AIDS's Acoustic Shaduw: Illinois Addresses the Problems 
of Criminal Transfer of HN, 22 LOYOLA U. CHI. LJ. 497, 500 (1991) (discussing the traditional 
approaches to criminalizing HN transfer). 
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assault, battery, murder, manslaughter, and attempts to carry out these 
crimes.56 
These criminal frameworks have not been easily applied to HIV 
transfer because of the peculiar nature of HIV-related prosecutions. 57 
The HIV-related prosecutions are unique because without the disease, 
the actions at issue could never satisfY the elements of the statutory 
crimes. As a result, prosecutors have sometimes had difficulty obtaining 
convictions because of the inability to prove mens rea, or criminal 
intent, as required by many of these criminal statutes.58 
This proof difficulty might be especially amplified in the context 
of a woman giving birth. Many HIV-infected individuals prosecuted 
under traditional criminal statutes are in situations where criminal 
intent or the desire to hurt their victims may be readily inferred.59 It 
would be unlikely and difficult to prove, however, that a woman would 
elect to carry a baby for nine months and deliver it for reasons of 
harmful intent. Studies have been conducted on women's decisions to 
have children despite their seropositivity, and neither animosity nor 
the motive either to inflict harm or communicate the disease has been 
reported.60 
Individuals must also have some degree of knowledge of their HIV 
infection, or at least of the substantial likelihood of infection, before 
they could be accused of intent to cause harm by means of transfer to 
56 See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 846 F.2d 1163, 1167-68 (8th Cir. 1988) (affirming 
conviction of HIV-infected defendant for assault with deadly and dangerous weapon for biting 
two officers); State v. Smith, 621 A.2d 493, 502 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (affirming 
HIV-infected defendant's conviction for attempted murder and aggravated assault for biting an 
officer); Scroggins v. State, 401 S.E.2d 13, 18-19 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming conviction for 
aggravated assault with intent to murder of defendant who bit a police officer); Brock v. State, 
555 So. 2d 285, 288 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (overturning first-degree assault conviction of 
defendant who bit prison officer); State v. Sherouse, 536 So. 2d 1194, 1195 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1989) (dismissing attempted manslaughter charge against prostitute for offering to have sex with 
men despite her knowledge that she was HIV infected). See generally Mark H. Jackson, The 
Criminalization of HIV, in AIDS AGENDA, supra note 7, at 239. 
57 Leonard, supra note 55, at 500. 
5BFor example, in at least one case, it was observed that a HIV-infected woman's offer of 
prostitution was not adequate to prove specific intent to kill. Sherouse, 536 So. 2d at 1194 (Cobb, 
j., concurring). 
59 See, e.g., State v. Haines, 545 N.E.2d 834, 835 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (defendant screamed 
he had AIDS and would kill anyone who tried to prevent him from committing suicide). 
60 See R. T. Henrion et aI., HIV-Infected Women's Decision to Continue or Terminate Pregnancy, 
20 PRESSE MED 896-98 (May 18, 1991) ("Motivations for continuing pregnancy included a visceral 
desire to have a child, a means of transcending one's mortality, a gift to the partner, a means of 
rehabilitation, a denial of the pathologic state or the conviction that the infant will be unaf-
fected."); Peter A. Selwyn et aI., Knawledge of HIV Antibody Status and Decisions to Continue or 
Terminate Pregnancy Among Intravenous Drug Users, 261 JAMA 3567, 3567 (June 23-30, 1989) 
("Women who were HIV positive and chose to continue their pregnancies cited the desire for a 
child, religious beliefs, and family pressure as the most important factors in their decisions."). 
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another.61 Further, there is some indication that a woman would need 
to have knowledge that HIV could be transmitted perinatally to her 
baby before she could be convicted of the action under traditional 
criminal statutes.62 
b. The creation of HIV transfer statutes 
In the last five to ten years, states have attempted to circumvent 
these problems with traditional criminal statutes by enacting specific 
HIV transfer statutes. By creating a new, particularized crime, states 
have made obtaining convictions easier. Currently, approximately 
twenty-five states have at least some form of an HIV transmission or 
exposure statute.63 This Article will focus on eleven state statutes, which 
either specifically address perinatal transmission64 or are most likely to 
evoke concern about their potential applicability to perinatal transmis-
sion.65 
The majority of these criminal HIV transfer statutes include one 
or more of the following elements in various combinations: 
1. Some knowledge of HIV status;66 
2. An intent to infect;67 
61 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 621 A.2d 493, 502 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (defendant's 
conviction for attempted murder reasonable in light of proof that defendant knew he was HlV 
infected and subjectively believed his bite could kill someone); State v. Scroggins, 401 S.E.2d 13, 
18-19 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) Uury could infer malicious intent from defendant's knowledge that 
he was HlV infected and deliberately bit police officer). 
62 See, e.g., Brock v. State, 555 So. 2d 285, 288 (overturning attempted murder conviction for 
lack of evidence that defendant knew human bite could transmit HlV). 
63 These states include: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. AIDS 
POLICY CENTER, INTERGOVERNMENTAL HEALTH POLICY PROJECT, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY, Criminal Penalties for Knowingly Transmitting/Exposing Another to HIV Injection 
(Oct. 1992). 
640KLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (1991); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.012 (West 1993). 
65 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie 1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1201 (1992); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 16-5-60 (Michie 1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (1992); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 
12-16.2 (1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-7 (Burns 1991); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. 
§ 18-601.1 (1992); Mo. REv. STAT. § 191.677 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-60 (Law. Co-op. 
1991); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-47 (1992). 
66 In other words, the accused must have some degree of awareness that she is infected with 
HlV/AIDS. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123(b); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(c); IDAHO CODE § 39-
608(1) (1992); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2; IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-7(b); MD. 
HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-601.1(a); Mo. REv. STAT. § 191.677(1); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, 
§ 1192.1 (A); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-60; TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.012(a); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300ff-47 (a) (1) (1992). 
67IDAHO CODE § 39-608(1); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-7(b); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, 
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3. Some description of particular conduct, such as "expo-
sure,"68 "intimate conduct,"69 "conduct reasonably likely to 
result in transfer,"70 "creat[ing] a grave and unjustifiable risk 
ofinfecting,"71 "sexual conduct,"72 "parenteral transfer,"73 or a 
variation of delivering, transferring, donating, providing, or 
selling;74 
4. Fluid or product that is being transferred or exposed;15 
5. A recipient of the transfer or exposure;76 
6. Exemptions and qualifications;77 and 
7. A criminal label and punishment.78 
IS 
Only two of these statutes explicitly exempt in utero transmission 
from the offense.79 None explicitly includes perinatal transfer. At least 
nine of the others could arguably be extended to reach a woman for 
transmitting HIV to her fetus. The next subparts discuss these argu-
ments and explain why these prosecutions should not be undertaken. 
§ 1192.1 (A); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.012(a); WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.36.021 (d), (e) (1991); 
see also 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-47(a)(l) (1992). 
68 ARK. CODE ANN. § S-I4-123(b); IDAHO CODE § 39--608(1); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-60; 
WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.36.021 (1) (e). 
69 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, par. 12-16.2(a)(I), (b). 
70 OKLA. STAT. tit 21, § 1192.1 (A); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.012(a); see also DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 16, § 1201 ("manner known to transmit HIV"). 
71 Mo. REv. STAT. § 191.677(1). 
72ARK. CODE ANN. § S-I4-123(b); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-S...(i0(c) (1), (3), (4); Mo. REv. STAT. 
§ 191.677(1); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-47(a) (2) (1992). 
73ARK. CODE ANN. § S-I4-123(b); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1201(9). 
74 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-S-60(c)(S); IDAHO CODE § 39-608(1), (2) (b); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, 
para. 12-16.2(a)(2); IND. CODE ANN. § 3S-42-1-7(b); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-
60U(a); Mo. REv. STAT. § 191.677(1); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-47(a)(1) (1992). 
75 ARK. CODE ANN. § S-I4-123(b); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1201(9); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-S...(i0(c)(S); IDAHO CODE § 39--608(1), (2); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2(a)(2); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 3S-42-1-7(b); Mo. REv. STAT. § 191.677(1); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (A); TEx. 
PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.012(a); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-47(a) (1) (1992). 
76 ARK. CODE ANN. § S-I4-123(b); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-S...(i0(c); IDAHO CODE § 39-608(1), 
(2); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2(a), (b); IND. CODE ANN. § 3S-42-1-7(c); MD. HEALTH-
GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-601.1 (a); Mo. REv. STAT. § 191.677(2); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (A); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29...(i0; TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.012(a); WASH. REv. CODE 
§ 9A.36.021 (1)(d) , (e); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-47(a) (1992). 
77IDAHO CODE § 39-608(3); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2(d); IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 3S-42-1-7(d); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (A); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.012(a); see also 42 
U.S.C. § 300ff-47(b) (1992). 
78ARK. CODE ANN. § S-I4-123(d); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-S--60(c); IDAHO CODE § 39--608(1); 
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2(e); IND. CODE ANN. § 3S-42-1-7(b) , (c); MD. HEALTH-GEN. 
CODE ANN. § 18-60U(b); Mo. REv. STAT. § 191.677(2); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (A); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 44-29-60; TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.012(c); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.021 (2). 
79 OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (A); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.0l2(a). 
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3. The Application of HIV Transmission Statutes to Women of 
Childbearing Age 
As described above, there are numerous elements that playa role 
in the determination of criminality under HIV transfer statutes. The 
interpretation given to these elements determines whether the statutes 
could apply to childbearing women. Assuming that a woman knows 
she is HIV infected, the most significant elements in determining 
whether the statutes could apply are (a) the defined criminal conduct, 
(b) the defined fluid or product being passed and the defined recipi-
ent of the fluid or product, and (c) possible statutory defenses, includ-
ing explicit exemption of in utero transmission, and lack of harmful 
intent or knowledge of the means of HIV transmission. 
a. The defined conduct 
The language used to define criminalized transfer actions is piv-
otal in assessing the applicability of a statute to mother-fetus HIV 
transmission. In the above-mentioned statutes, the designated transfer 
actions most threatening to women's childbearing autonomy are "ex-
pos[ure],"80 "intimate conduct,"81 "conduct reasonably likely to result 
in transfer,"82 and "creat[ing] a grave and unjustifiable risk of in-
fecti[on]."83 
"Expose" is defined as "to place in a position where the object 
spoken of is open to danger, or where it is near or accessible to 
anything which may affect it detrimentally; as, to 'expose' a child ... 
or another to a contagious disease .... "84 The mechanics and timing 
of perinatal HIV transmission are not well known.85 Studies have indi-
80 IDAHO CODE § 39-608(1); s.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-60; WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.36.021 (e). 
81 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2(a) (1). 
For a comprehensive discussion of Illinois's criminal HIV transmission statute and its appli-
cation to pregnant women, see Isaacman, supra note 9. Isaacman reports that evidently, none of 
the drafters of Illinois's statute solicited any input from health professionals. Id. at 485 n.43, 486 
(citations omitted). Further, the legislative history does not indicate that there was any discussion 
of perinatal transmission at all. Id. at 485 n.43. This omission makes one wonder whether Illinois 
and other states unintentionally created HIV statutes which could be applied to pregnant women 
simply because they did not adequately perceive the repercussions of their statutory language. 
82 OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (A); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.012(a); see also DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit 16, § 1201 (9) ("manner known to transmit HIV"). 
83 Mo. REv. STAT. § 191.677(1). 
84BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 579 (6th ed. 1990). The Washington Court of Appeals has, for 
example, interpreted a statute's use of the term "expose" to mean "engaging in conduct that can 
cause another person to become infected with the virus." State v. Stark, 832 P.2d 109, 116 (Wash. 
Ct App. 1992). 
85 Modlin & Saah, supra note 13, at 40. 
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cated that the HIV transfer often occurs very late in pregnancy or 
during delivery.86 Regardless of when the transmission occurs, however, 
under the definition cited above, an HIV-infected woman is likely to 
"expose" either her fetus or her infant (before the umbilical cord is 
cut) to HIV.87 
The definition of "intimate conduct" poses a similar problem. 
Because that term has been defined as "the exposure of the body of 
one person to a bodily fluid of another person in a manner that could 
result in the transmission of HIV,"88 a similar argument could be used 
to explain the statute's application to pregnant seropositive women. 
It is also probable that perinatal exposure would be considered to 
constitute a "reasonable likelihood" of exposure, or to involve "knowl-
edge" of transmitting HIV, given the estimated 7 to 40% chance that 
a seropositive woman will bear an infected child.89 On the other hand, 
the application of the standard of "creat[ing] a grave and unjustifiable 
risk of infecting" to pregnant women depends on the determination 
of what risks are "grave and unjustifiable." Exposing a fetus to HIV 
arguably bestows a "grave" risk of illness and death that cannot be 
justified. Others have pointed out, however, that once a mother is 
pregnant, opting for abortion gives the fetus a 100% chance of death, 
whereas continuing pregnancy gives the fetus at least a 60% chance 
for healthy life.90 
Use of the term "parenteral" transfer in HIV transmission statutes 
may also be a threat to HIV-infected women's ability to procreate.91 
"Parenteral," by definition, does not exclude perinatal transfer. It is 
defined as a transfer "by some other means than through the gastro-
86 See, e.g., James J. Goedert et aI., High Risk of HIV-l Infedion far First-Barn Twins, 338 
LANCET 1471, 1473 (Dec. 1991) (reporting results of a study indicating that while some infants 
may become infected before delivery, a substantial proportion of HlV transfer occurs during 
labor); A. Ehrnst et aI., HIV in Pregnant Women and Their OffSPring: Evidence for Late Transmis-
sion, 338 LANCET 203, 206 Uuly 1991) (finding that in most infants HlV transfer occurs "close to 
or at delivery"). 
87For a discussion of the definition of the recipient of the exposure-Le., whether the 
legislatures intended "person" or "another" to apply to a fetus or a newborn-see infra notes 
99-104 and accompanying text. 
88 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2(b). A recent Illinois case has held that by participating 
in certain conduct recognized as allowing transmission of HlV, a defendant "clearly exposed the 
body of another to his bodily fluid in a manner that could result in the transmission of HlV." 
People v. Dempsey, 610 N.E.2d 208, 223 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
89 See supra note 44. 
90Isaacman, supra note 9, at 491; Jones, supra note 13, at 1173. This forms the basis for a 
strong public policy argument against coerced prenatal HlV testing and punitive measures, which 
are likely to create incentives for abortion. See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text. 
91 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (parenteral transfer of blood); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, 
§ 1201 (parenteral exposure to blood). 
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intestinal tract or lungs; referring particularly to the introduction of 
substances into an organism .... "92 The fluids and nutrients that the 
mother circulates to her fetus do not enter through the fetus's gastro-
intestinal tract or lungs. Instead, maternal blood circulates nutrients 
and other substances that are filtered through her placenta into the 
umbilical cord and into the fetus's bloodstream.93 Thus, perinatal trans-
fer or exposure is arguably within the meaning of "parenteral" transfer 
or exposure as used in this context. On the other hand, this application 
to pregnant women might be more elusive than it seems, because 
despite its strict definition, the general medical use of the term is in 
reference to "intravenous, subcutaneous, intramuscular, or intramedul-
lary injection," and not generally to perinatal transfer.94 
Moreover, HIV transfer statutes using the expressions "donation" 
or "transfer" could also arguably include the flow of blood and other 
fluids from a pregnant woman to her fetus or newborn.95 "Donate" is 
defined as "to present as a gift, grant, or contribution .... "96 "Trans-
fer" means "to conveyor remove from one place, person, etc., to 
another .... "97 Under these definitions, a pregnant mother arguably 
donates, and more convincingly transfers, blood and other fluids into 
the body of her fetus and newborn infant, and thus could be prose-
cuted under these statutes. Generally, however, these statutes seem 
directed toward those who give blood to an individual or an institution 
for medical or scientific reasons, and not to a mother who naturally 
passes blood to her fetus. 
N one of these definitions strictly precludes applicability to vertical 
transmission. On the other hand, there also seems to be a decided lack 
of legislative intent to include perinatal transfer. Until clear evidence 
of statutory intent is expressed one way or another, it is vital to examine 
the other elements of criminalized HIV transmission to defend against 
the removal of childbearing rights of women with HIV / AIDS. 
b. The fluid (ff product passed and the recipient 
The defined statutory substances transmitted and the specified 
recipients of those substances are also relevant considerations in de-
92 STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1031 (24th ed. 1982). 
93 See WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 58-61 (F. Gary Cunningham, M.D. et al. eds., 18th ed. 1989). 
94 STEDMAN's MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1031 (24th ed. 1982). 
95 See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60 ("donates"); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-7 ("donates or 
transfers"); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN., § 18-601.1 (transfer or attempt to transfer); see also 
42 U.S.C. § 30O£f-47 (1992) (makes a donation). 
96RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 582 (2d ed. unabridged 1987). 
97Id. at 2009; see also BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1497 (6th ed. 1990). 
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termining whether a statute applies to a pregnant woman. These stat-
utes define blood, blood products, and other potentially infectious 
body fluids as criminal substances.98 These definitions are important 
because a pregnant woman invariably transfers blood and other bodily 
fluids to her fetus and newborn infant before the umbilical cord is cut. 
In the statutes that define the recipient of the transferred sub-
stance, that recipient is usually referred to as a "person"99 or simply as 
"another. "100 The Supreme Court has held that a fetus is not a person 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. lOI Many state courts have also held 
that the unborn fetus is not considered a "person" or "human being" 
under criminal or civil law. I02 Under this interpretation, any statutes 
criminalizing exposure or transfer to a "person" would not apply to the 
mother-fetus transfer. It is unclear whether this interpretation would 
be applicable to statutes that refer to transmission to "another." 
Further, if it can be shown that HIV transfer occurs after delivery 
but before the umbilical cord is cut, proponents of perinatal HIV 
prosecutions might argue that a newborn baby is sufficiently a "person" 
or "another" under the Constitution to justify state protection. On the 
other hand, this argument has been attempted by advocates of prose-
cutions under statutes proscribing drug delivery to minors, but has 
generally been rejected by the courts.l°3 Instead, these courts have 
98 See 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-47(a)(1) (1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123(b); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 16, § 1201(9); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60 (c) (5); IDAHO CODE § 39-608(1), (2); ILL. REv. STAT. 
ch. 38, para. 12-16.2(a) (2), (b); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-7(b); Mo. REv. STAT. § 191.677(1); 
OKLA. STAT. tit 21, § 1192.1 (A); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.012(a). 
99 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123(b); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(c); IDAHO CODE § 39-608; 
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2(b); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-7(c); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE 
ANN. § 18-601.1 (a); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.012(a). 
100 See 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-47(a) (1) (1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-608(a); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, 
para. 12-16.2(a); Mo. REv. STAT. § 191.677(1); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (A); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 44-29-60; TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.012(a); WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.36.021 (d). 
101 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-57 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 
2839 (1992) (Stevens, j., dissenting). 
102 See, e.g., Egger v. State, 817 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) ("Even though the life 
of the unborn may have some value, the United States Supreme Court has determined that it is 
the mother of the unborn who must ascribe that value and not the consciences of those who 
oppose abortion."); State v. Harbert, 758 P.2d 826, 827-28 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (state penal 
statutes do not specifY the inclusion of fetus in the definition of person, and that "words not 
found in the text of a criminal statute will not be read into it for the purpose of extending it 
... ."); Billingsley v. State, 360 S.E.2d 451, 452 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (common law did not consider 
unborn fetus to be a "person" or "human being"); Meadows v. State, 722 S.W.2d 584, 585 (Ark. 
1987) (unborn fetus was not included as a person or a human being within meaning of statute, 
and court should not create new common law claims). But see State v. Knapp, No. WD 44098 
(Mo. App. Dec. 3, 1991) (finding that viable fetuses were intended to be included under the 
definition of person in particular circumstances). 
103 See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text. 
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found that legislators did not intend the statutes to cover the short 
period of time after a baby is born and before the umbilical cord is 
cut.104 
c. Possible defenses 
As mentioned above, several HIV criminalization statutes contain 
clauses that exempt perinatal transmission. Other statutes contain de-
fense clauses that, although less explicit, would also probably exempt 
most pregnant women. For example, several states require that an 
element of harmful intent be present before an individual may be 
convicted for HIV transfer. Washington's provision, for example, would 
likely preclude the prosecution of nearly all pregnant women, because 
it requires an "intent to inflict bodily harm."lo5 The situation is some-
what less clear in statutes requiring only an intent to infect or an intent 
to transfer HIV-infected blood or other fluids. lo6 It is not clear whether 
a woman's awareness of her own seropositivity would be sufficient to 
show such intent, or whether more specific intent to cause harm would 
be necessary. 
Other statutory defenses rely on an individual's knowledge of the 
nature of HIV infection and transmission. Missouri's statute would 
require a pregnant woman to understand that by allowing herself to 
become or remain pregnant, she is creating a "grave and unjustifiable 
risk of infecting ... " her fetus. lo7 This implies that women who do not 
have this understanding could not be convicted under this statute. 
Other state statutes are more ambiguous and require that an individual 
with HIV not "knowingly transfer or attempt to transfer" or "knowingly 
expose" another to HIV.108 It is not clear whether these statutes are 
referring to knowing one's HIV status, knowingly engaging in particu-
lar conduct, or knowing that this conduct can infect another. 
104 See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1290 (Fla. 1992) ("We find that the legislative 
history does not show a manifest intent to use the word 'delivery' [of a controlled substance] in 
the context of criminally prosecuting mothers for delivery ... by way of the umbilical cord."). 
105 WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.36.021 (d), (e). It would be unlikely and very difficult to prove that 
a seropositive woman would become or remain pregnant in order to inflict harm upon a child. 
See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. 
106 See IDAHO CODE § 39-608(1) ("intent to infect"); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-7(b) ("reck-
lessly, knowingly, or intentionally donates, sells, or transfers blood"); 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-47(a)(l) 
(1992) ("intends to expose"). 
107 See Mo. REv. STAT. § 191.677(2). 
lOS See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-7(b) (Burns 1991) ("knowingly ... donates, sells, or 
transfers"); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-601.1(a) ("knowingly transfer or attempt to 
transfer"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-60 ("knowingly expose"). 
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The degree of knowledge required in these states may determine 
whether a woman is convicted or acquitted. Case law sufficient for the 
elucidation of firm standards has not yet developed. It can be inferred 
from the statutory language, however, that it would be very difficult to 
convict a woman who did not know she was seropositive when she 
became pregnant. Further, if a state is unable to prove that the woman 
knew that HIV could be transferred to a fetus or newborn, it would 
also be hard put to prove "knowing transfer" or exposure. Where a 
certain degree of deliberation is required, women who did not inten-
tionally become pregnant may also find an affirmative defense to 
conviction. 
III. WOMEN MUST NOT BE SCREENED, PROSECUTED, OR PUNISHED 
FOR PERINATAL TRANSFER OF HIV 
Part II of this Article discussed how child abuse or neglect statutes 
and HIV transmission statutes could be extended to apply to HIV 
transfer from a pregnant woman to her fetus. This Part explains why 
screening, prosecution, and punishment would violate women's con-
stitutional rights of liberty and privacy, and why these statutes would 
work against sensible public policies rather than accomplishing legiti-
mate state goals. 
A. Fundamental Constitutional Rights 
What makes a right fundamental for the purposes of substantive 
due process? Justice Cardozo described such a right as "a principle of 
justice . . . rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people 
•••• "109 An individual's right to have a child, and not to have this right 
unduly interfered with, is one such principle of justiceYo Indeed, 
American "traditions and conscience" have long protected decisions 
relating to and furthering the family,1ll as well as decisions involving 
bodily integrity and choiceY2 A state cannot interfere with such fun-
damental rights unless that interference is demonstrated to promote 
a compelling state interest, and the means used by the state are nar-
rowly tailored to serve those compelling interests. ll3 
109 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.s. 319, 325 (1937) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 
97,105 (1934)). 
110 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
III See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
112 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
113 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973) ("[R]egulations imposing a burden on [a 
fundamental right] may be justified only by compelling state interests, and must be narrowly 
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1. Liberty and Reproductive Autonomy 
The decision to have a child has long been regarded as a funda-
men tal righ t.114 The discussion of this right has involved two aspects of 
the issue: the right not to have a child or to terminate a pregnancy, 
and the affirmative entitlement to choose to bear offspring.ll5 While 
both of these rights have been accorded constitutional protection, 116 
greater attention has been paid to the former right, probably because 
of the issues of life and death that are involved in the termination of 
a pregnancy. However, the right of a woman with HIV / AIDS to con-
ceive and give birth to a child without being punished for it involves 
the latter right. This positive right to procreate is fundamental to 
American constitutional ideals and principles.1l7 
The affirmative right to reproduce may be particularly important 
to defend because it promotes life and life-giving, and the creation of 
family and progeny.Hs 
Reproduction is a basic instinct that supplies societies with 
the members who maintain and perpetuate the social order 
and who provide services for others. Reproduction also 
satisfies an individual's natural drive for sex and his or her 
drawn to express only those interests."); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 
16-17 (1973) ("[S]trict scrutiny means that ... the State must demonstrate that [the offending 
statute] has been structured with 'precision,' and is 'tailored' narrowly to serve legitimate 
objectives and that it has selected the 'less drastic means' for effectuating its objectives .... H). 
114 Reproductive autonomy is rooted in the concept of federal substantive due process rights, 
which are applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Carey v. Population 
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) (holding that the ability to decide whether or not to "bear 
or beget" a child is a fundamental right); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 
(1974) ("This court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage 
and family life is one of the liberties protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment."); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means 
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether 
to bear or beget a child. H); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) ("The rights to conceive 
and raise one's children have been deemed 'essential,' ... 'basic civil rights of man,' ... and 
'rights far more precious ... than property rights' .... H); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 
541 (1942) (striking down a sterilization statute on the basis that "[m]arriage and procreation 
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390,399 (1923) (stating that under the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of liberty, individuals 
have "the right ... to marry, establish a home and bring up children .... "). 
115 See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and 
Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 406 (1983) (discussing the differences between the right to avoid 
and the right to exercise childbirth). 
116 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. 
117 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
118Robertson, supra note 115, at 408-10. 
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continuity with nature and future generations. It fulfills cul-
tural norms and individual goals about a good or fulfilled life, 
and many consider it the most important thing a person does 
with his or her life. 1l9 
23 
Furthermore, many consider the passing on of one's genes to be a 
mark of immortality, self-worth, and contribution to the world.120 
Decisions about how we will use our reproductive powers are 
decisions about our own future and about our own contribu-
tion to the future of the human community, about how one's 
life is to count, and how far its influence is to extend. . .. 
[T] he very dignity and identity of the person as a moral being 
is at stake in any decision to use compulsion in controlling 
reproductive behavior.121 
Many of these rationales are reflected in the reasons women have 
given for deciding to have children even after the women discov-
ered they were HIV infected. When asked why they continue their 
pregnancies, women with HIV / AIDS emphasize their ''visceral de-
sire" to bear children, their religious beliefs, and their perception 
of procreation as "a means of transcending one's mortality" and a 
way to achieve some kind of rehabilitation.122 
Extending child abuse and neglect statutes and criminal HIV 
transmission statutes to the prosecution of perinatal HIV transfer in-
terferes with HIV-infected women's reproductive autonomy. Although 
these women may physically have the ability to conceive and bear a 
child, the threat of punishment in effect precludes procreation by 
these women.l23 
119 [d. at 408. 
Numerous others have noted that fertility, childbearing, and motherhood may be especially 
important to Mrican-American women. See, e.g., Kass, supra note 13, at 318. Yet, African-American 
women are disproportionately victimized by AIDS, and are thus most vulnerable to having 
procreative choice taken away. See infra notes 182-85 and accompanying text. 
120 Robertson, supra note 115, at 409 n.12. 
121 [d. at 409 n.12 (quoting Arthur J. Dyck, Population Policies and Ethical Acceptability, in 
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ScIENCES, 2 RAPID POPULATION GROWTH: CONSEQUENCES AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS 618, 625-26, 628-29 (1971» (other citations omitted). 
122 Henrion et al., supra note 60, at 896-98; Selwyn et al., supra note 60, at 3567-71. 
123 See Isaacman, supra note 9, at 489 (asserting that forcing HN-infected women to forgo 
childbearing under these conditions is "in effect, involuntary sterilization"). Because there is no 
cure for HN / AIDS at this point, this effective sterilization is permanent, making the harshness 
of these penalties even more clear. 
Statutes which in effect preclude women with HN / AIDS from bearing children may violate 
the constitutional ban against bills of attainder, or bills of pains and penalties. See U.S. CONST. 
art. I, §§ 9, 10. A bill of pain and penalty is a statute that singles out and inflicts sanctions (other 
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As discussed above, at least nine states attach criminal labels and 
punishments to HIV transmission statutes that could be applied to 
perinatal HIV transfer.124 The majority of these statutes classifY HIV 
transmission as a felony, which could result in lengthy prison sentences 
or severe fines. 125 There are similar penalties for statutes forbidding 
drug delivery to minors.126 Furthermore, conviction under child abuse 
or neglect statutes can temporarily or permanently divest a mother of 
custody of her child.127 
If these statutes were successfully applied to women with HIV, 
these women would have to choose either to refrain from procreation 
or to break the law. 128 When the consequences could include years of 
imprisonment, costly fines (which the woman might not be able to 
afford), or having a child taken away, this choice is no choice at all. 
Such an impermissible interference with an individual's fundamental 
than death) upon a particular individual or group without a judicial determination or hearing. 
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 447-49 (1965); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303,315 
(1946). Although the conviction of a woman for perinatal HIV transmission would require a trial, 
the trial would be of little consequence, because once a woman is HIV infected she will inevitably 
be "guilty" if she becomes pregnant. She is being punished-effectively sterilized-for her status 
as an HIV-infected woman. If she wants to avoid other punishment, she must refrain from getting 
pregnant, amounting to compulsory sterilization. 
This penalty is effectively the same as legislature-imposed punishment, which is exactly what 
the Article I ban sought to prevent. See Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (D. Iowa 1914) (holding that a 
statute commanding vasectomies for all men twice convicted of a felony was unconstitutional 
because it was in effect a bill of attainder), rev'd on other grounds, 242 U.S. 468 (1917). The Davis 
court also emphasized the cruelty of the penalty in making its decision: 
[Tlo destroy the power of procreation ... is, of course, to follow the man during 
the balance of his life. The physical suffering may not be so great, but that is not 
the only test of cruel punishment; the humiliation, the degradation, the mental 
suffering are always present and known by all the public, and will follow him 
wheresoever he may go. This belongs to the Dark Ages. 
Id. at 416. Similar arguments can be made against criminalizing pregnancy for HIV-infected 
women. 
124 See supra notes 55-108 and accompanying text. 
125 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (up to 15 years in jail, up to $5,000 fine, or combination 
of both); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (up to five years injail). See also MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE 
ANN. § 18-601.1 (labeled a misdemeanor but punishable by up to 3 years in jail, a fine of up to 
$2,500 or both). 
126 See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3409 (1993) (imprisonment for "sentence imposed 
by court" and fine of $2000 or three times value of substance, whichever is greater); CAL. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE § 11353 (West 1993) (imprisonment for three to nine years); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 41-29-139 (1993) (not more than one year imprisonment, fine of not more than $1000, or 
both); NEV. REv. STAT. § 453.334 (1991) (prison for one to ten years and fine of not more than 
$10,000 for first offense; life sentence and fine up to $20,000 for second offense). 
127 See supra notes 37-53 and accompanying text; see also MASS. GEN. L. ch. 119, § 24 (1993); 
OKLA STAT. tit. 10, § 1130 (1993);W. VA. CODE § 49-6-5 (1993). 
128 Isaacman, supra note 9, at 489. 
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right to reproduce cannot be justified unless it survives strict scrutiny, 
and is narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. 129 
2. The Fundamental Right to Privacy 
Implementing prosecutions for perinatal transmission of HIV in-
evitably involves extensive HIV testing of mothers and infants. Such 
testing evokes additional constitutional analysis of issues involving an 
individual's right to privacy. 
Personal privacy is considered a fundamental right under the 
Constitution.130 This privacy right has been interpreted to protect an 
individual's bodily integrity and choice. l3l An HIV testing program 
would raise numerous questions relating to the issue of bodily integrity 
and privacy: what population would be tested and at what stages, 
whether testing would be mandatory or voluntary, and what the con-
sequences of testing positive would be. 
If a state wished to extensively enforce a criminal perinatal HIV 
transfer statute, it would likely demand mandatory testing of all preg-
nant women, with consistent penalties assigned.132 Mandatory HIV 
129 See id. at 492 (stating that extending HlV transmission statutes to perinatal transfer violates 
women's fundamental liberty rights, and thus, that strict scrutiny must be applied) (citing 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978); Stanleyv. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,651 (1972); Shelton 
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1960); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923». 
Since a fundamental right is implicated in the decision to impose sterilization upon 
an individual, the state must demonstrate a compelling state interest before it may 
constitutionally deprive an individual of that right If a less restrictive alternative is 
available that can achieve the same stated goal without depriving an individual of 
a fundamental right, it must be utilized. 
Estate of C.W., 1993 Pa. Super. LEXIS 857, at *9 (citations omitted). 
130 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) ("[T]he Court has recognized that a right 
of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the 
Constitution."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, j., concurring) 
(''Various guarantees [in the Bill of Rights] create zones of privacy."). 
131 See Anita Allen, Legal Issues in Nonvoluntary Prenatal HIV Screening, in NEXT GENERA-
TION, supra note 10, at 178-79 (discussing the association between the constitutional right to 
privacy and the right to bodily integrity); see also Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 
225 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the right to privacy "guarantees to the individual the 
freedom to choose to reject, or refuse to consent to, intrusion of his bodily integrity"); Superin-
tendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass. 1979) (Massachusetts law 
acknowledges an individual's "strong interest in being free from nonconsensual invasion of his 
bodily integrity"). 
132 1 begin with this assumption in light of the equal protection implications that would be 
involved were states to screen only high-risk groups. See infra text accompanying notes 181-91. 
The equal protection issues involved here are numerous, and a comprehensive discussion of them 
is beyond the scope of this article. I give only a brief overview for explanatory purposes. 
Since HlV occurs so disproportionately in poor women of color, see infra text accompanying 
notes 181-87, poor women of color would predominantly be tested, prosecuted, and penalized 
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testing would require the taking of blood from a woman even without 
her consent. This unwelcome bodily invasion arguably violates an in-
dividual's bodily integrity and fundamental right to privacy. 133 As men-
tioned above, such a violation cannot be justified unless the govern-
ment can prove that the practice serves a compelling interest, and is 
the least restrictive means for doing so. 
Although this strict scrutiny test offers some protection, courts 
have often held that a state's interest in protecting public health and 
welfare supersedes nearly all personal rights.134 This justification has 
been used to permit widespread screening for diseases such as syphilis, 
hepatitis B, sickle-cell anemia, cystic fibrosis, Tay-Sachs disease, and 
phenylketonuria (PKU) .135 Public health and welfare arguments have 
also justified mandatory vaccinations, medical examinations, and even 
certain quarantines. 136 Courts have been especially willing to interfere 
as members of high-risk groups. Because of the history of eugenic selectivity, because the govern-
ment has not previously devoted much energy to the promotion of the health of babies of color, 
and because the government has often refrained from initiating mandatory testing programs for 
diseases prevalent in Caucasians, the motive for mandatory HlV screening would be suspect and 
subject to challenge. See supra text accompanying notes 16-36 (describing the history of eugenic 
selectivity); infra text accompanying note 191 (noting that there has been no drive for mandatory 
testing for cystic fibrosis, a disease primarily affecting Caucasians); see also Hunter, supra note 7, 
at 17 (stating that the government has demonstrated "no great zeal" towards protecting the health 
of African-American and Latino babies, and that in fact the infant mortality rates in these 
communities are not substantially different from infant mortality rates in impoverished coun-
tries). 
Even if mandatory testing of all pregnant women were instituted, there would likely be equal 
protection challenges based on gender inequality. The success of such challenges would depend 
on whether courts determined men and women to be "similarly situated" with regard to posing 
a risk of vertical transmission. Hunter, supra note 7, at 21. It is likely that courts would not decide 
that they were so situated, because a father's HlV infection is not sufficient to cause a fetus to 
become infected; the mother must be infected herself to create the risk of vertical transmission. 
Id. Thus, an equal protection claim is likely to fail. Id. at 22. 
133 Allen, supra note 131, at 179. 
134 See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991) (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring) 
(state public heath and safety powers may override free speech interests of nude dancers); 
Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (sobriety checkpoint program justified 
on public health and safety grounds does not violate Fourth Amendment rights of drivers) ;Jones 
v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983) (insane person may be confined without consent if danger-
ous to society). 
135 See Acuff & Faden, supra note 10, at 59-80 (discussing history of governmental screening 
programs); Kass, supra note 13, at 310-12 (describing differences between HlV and other diseases 
which have been screened). 
136 Allen, supra note 131, at 168; Susan]. Levy, The Constitutional Implications of Mandatary 
Testing Far Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-AIDS, 37 EMORY LJ. 217, 218 (988). See, e.g., 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (905) (affirming a state's practice of compulsory smallpox 
vaccinations); Compagnie Franpise v. State Board of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (902) (upholding 
quarantine statute for persons suspected of having an infectious disease); Reynolds v. McNichols, 
488 F.2d 1378 OOth Cir. 1973) (upholding statute authorizing detention, examination, and 
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with women's personal rights when they are pregnant III order to 
further fetal health. 137 
There are many factors, however, that distinguish HIV from other 
diseases for which women have been screened, and that demonstrate 
why compulsory screening for HIV should not be conducted. Several 
commentators have compared and contrasted particular characteristics 
and consequences of HIV / AIDS with those of these other diseases. 138 
They have attempted to weigh the importance of several factors in 
deciding the balance between women's constitutional rights and public 
health needs. These factors include the availability of effective treat-
ment, prevalence of the disorder, rates of transmission, and severity of 
the illness.139 
Considering these factors, the situation for HIV-infected women 
of childbearing age is distinguishable from the above-mentioned dis-
eases. Other mandatory testing programs have been implemented for 
treatment and prevention purposes and not for punitive reasons. For 
treatment of any individual "reasonably suspected of having a venereal disease"); Hanzel v. Arter, 
625 F. Supp. 1259 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (school requirement of immunization does not violate right 
to privacy). But seeJew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900) (overturning a quarantine 
for individuals with bubonic plague, because of unnecessary intrusion on liberty and privacy 
interests) . 
137 See, e.g., In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. App. 1987), rev'd, 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(ordering a caesarian section to be performed on a woman in an attempt to save her 25-week 
fetus, which had a 50 to 60% chance of survival). The A. C. court made this order despite physician 
acknowledgement that the surgery would accelerate the death of the mother, who had cancer. 
This decision was overturned by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, long after it 
could do the mother any good. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See also Jefferson v. 
Griffin Spalding County Hosp., 274 S.E.2d 457, 460 (Ga. 1981) (forcing a woman to have a 
caesarian section procedure despite her refusal on religious grounds); Raleigh Fifkin-Paul Me-
morial Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537, 538 (N]. 1964) (per curiam) (ordering pregnant woman 
to submit to blood transfusion despite her religious objections), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964). 
But see Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d 395, 396 (Mass. 1983) (reversing order to have a woman's cervix 
sutured "to hold her pregn~ncy" because of the woman's religious objections); Tamar Lewin, 
Courts Acting to Force Care of the Unborn, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 23, 1987, atAI (reporting court's refusal 
to order a woman to undergo caesarian section, holding that pregnant women also have the right 
to choose whether or not to have surgery). 
Courts have even ordered that brain-dead pregnant women be kept alive on machines for 
months in order to allow their pregnancies to continue to term. See, e.g., Marc Fisher, Germany's 
Fetal Position; If a Mother Dies, Should Her Pregnancy Continue?, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1992, at 
Cl (reporting brain-dead 18-year-old woman kept alive on machines to continue her twelve-week-
old fetus to term). See generally ANNAS ET AL., supra note 4, at 978-88. 
138 See, e.g., Acuff & Faden, supra note 10, at 59-80 (comparing AIDS to syphilis, PKU, 
sickle-cell anemia, Tay-Sachs disease, neural tube defects, and hepatitis-B); Kass, supra note 13, 
at 309-12 (discussing distinctions between HIV and syphilis, hepatitis-B, homozygous recessive 
traits, sickle-cell anemia, cystic fibrosis, and Tay-Sachs disease). For statistics comparing HIV to 
drug dependence, see supra note 13 and accompanying text, infra note 159. 
139 Acuff & Faden, supra note 10; Kass, supra note 13, at 309-10. 
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example, compulsory screening programs for congenital syphilis were 
set in motion after the United States Public Health Service emphasized 
that "prenatal syphilis is a preventable disease; its prevention depends 
upon the routine, early and repeated use of the serologic test for 
syphilis and adequate, early and continuous treatment of the mother 
up to the termination of the pregnancy. "140 Furthermore, women could 
refuse the syphilis test for "conscientious, religious, or other" rea-
sons.141 
Similar goals were present between 1963 and 1973, when forty-
three states enacted legislation, most of it mandatory, for screening for 
PKU.142 PKU is regarded as a disease well suited for screening programs 
in that it "has a known prevalence; the test is simple, safe and accurate; 
the cost of the test is low; and an effective treatment is available."143 In 
addition, these screening programs did not mandate punishment for 
parents who declined to be tested. 144 
In contrast, there are no cures, vaccines, or treatments for AIDS 
that do more than slow the progression of the disease,145 so any man-
datory testing program would result primarily in punishing the mother 
and consequently the child. Mandatory testing programs for diseases 
lacking cures or vaccines have been much less effective in attaining 
public health goals than widespread education and voluntary screen-
ing programs. 
A demonstrative example arises out of the different approaches 
to screening for sickle-cell anemia and Tay-Sachs disease that were 
taken in the early 1970s. No treatment was available at the time for 
either of these diseases, yet two very different strategies ensued. At first, 
sickle-cell anemia was attacked through mandatory screening pro-
grams, which were often poorly directed, inadequate and had little 
positive effect.146 Because of the lack of treatment available, the medical 
community emphasized the consequences of two carriers having a 
child together, so as to prevent the birth of infected newborns.147 The 
disproportionate numbers of Mrican Americans affected by the disease 
140 Acuff & Faden, supra note 10, at 63 (citations omitted). Compulsory screening programs 
of pregnant women for congenital syphilis began with New York's "Baby Health Bill" in 1938, 
and by 1945, 36 states and the federal government had passed prenatal syphilis screening laws. 
Id. at 62-63. 
141Id. at 62. 
142Id. at 65. 
143Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Hunter, supra note 7, at 28. 
146 Acuff & Faden, supra note 10, at 68-69. 
147Id. at 68-69, 71. 
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fueled opposition to the compulsory nature of the programs, in light 
of the eugenic implications of counseling against childbirth. Eventu-
ally, sickle-cell screenings were amended to be voluntary.148 
In contrast, large-scale, voluntary, community-based screening 
programs for Tay-Sachs carriers were set up in seventy-three cities and 
thirteen countries by 1980.149 Like sickle-cell counseling, Tay-Sachs 
counseling involved the dissemination of information regarding the 
consequences of childbearing by two carriers of the disease. In the 
noncompulsory, community-supportive context, however, the pro-
grams were effective. These voluntary screenings, combined with edu-
cational and counseling efforts, served to decrease the incidence of 
Tay-Sachs in Jewish infants by an estimated 60 to 85%.ISO 
A second reason that HIV / AIDS should not be treated in the same 
manner as other screened diseases stems from the perinatal incidence 
of HIV as compared to those other diseases. Although HIV prevalence 
and rate of perinatal transmission are not yet fully known, the esti-
mated figures indicate a lower occurrence of perinatal HIV than other 
diseases which have been targeted for compulsory screening. For ex-
ample, syphilis was far more rampant earlier in the century than AIDS 
is now, affecting approximately 20% of the population of the United 
States. lSI Since the perinatal transmission rate of syphilis is as high as 
70 to 100%,IS2 the incidence of infected babies was enormous. It was 
estimated in 1940 that each year women with syphilis were transmitting 
the disease to at least 85,000 fetuses. ls3 
In contrast, there were a total of 36,325 cases of AIDS in women 
reported to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) as of June 1993. ls4 
Also reported as of that date were a total of 4121 cases of pediatric 
AIDS related to a mother with or at risk of HIV infection. ISS The figures 
for seroprevalence are much more difficult to determine, but the CDC 
estimates that between 1989 and 1990,0.15% of childbearing women 
nationwide were HIV positive.ls6 When women with HIV / AIDS bear 
148Id. at 69. 
149Id. at 72. 
ISO Id. 
lSI Acuff & Faden, supra note 10, at 61 n.11. 
152Kass, supra note 13, at 310. 
153 Acuff & Faden, supra note 10, at 61. These figures were even more drastic considering 
that the United States' population was only 130 million at the time. Id. 
154 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV / AIDS SURVEILLANCE: SECOND QUARTER EDITION 
(July 1993). 
ISS Id. 
156 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, AIDS INFORMATION: HIV SEROPREVALENCE SURVEYS (Jan. 
1993). 
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children, between 7 and 40% of those children will develop their own 
seropositivity.157 Overall, it is estimated that approximately five to sev-
enty seropositive infants are born per ten thousand births. 158 In other 
words, approximately 0.05 to 0.7% of all babies born to all women will 
become HIV infected. 159 
These statistical differences play an important role in determining 
the balance between public health needs and women's privacy. There 
is some justification for testing for an infectious disease, especially 
when that disease is widespread and threatens to infect a large number 
of people. Such screening would only be justified, however, if there is 
evidence that it would help prevent the spread of the disease. 
AIDS is much less widespread160 and less easily transmitted161 than 
other diseases for which screenings have been conducted. Even though 
AIDS is a devastating disease, there is little evidence that screening 
would help to control its spread in light of the current lack of effective 
treatments or vaccines. In fact, AIDS has been less responsive to treat-
ment than nearly any disease for which screenings have been con-
ducted.162 Since the public health protection arguments are weak, 
more weight should be given to women's privacy rights. 
On account of these factors, mandatory prenatal screening pro-
grams for HIV are unjustified invasions of women's right to privacy and 
cannot be permitted unless the programs satisfy a strict scrutiny analy-
SIS. 
3. Strict Scrutiny is not Satisfied 
As mentioned above, in order to uphold a statute interfering with 
a woman's fundamental right to liberty and privacy, a court must find 
that the statute furthers a compelling state interest and utilizes the least 
restrictive means of accomplishing that purpose. 
157 See supra note 44. 
158 Kass, supra note 13, at 311. 
159 As another example, contrast these pediatric HIV figures with the number of children 
born drug dependent each year. Approximately 350,000 to 739,200 infants born annually have 
been exposed to at least one illegal drug in utero. Jones, supra note 13, at 1160-61. These figures 
represent approximately 10 to 20% of all babies born. See Anastasia Toufexis, Innocent Victims, 
TIME, May 13, 1991, at 56 (citing National Association for Perinatal Addiction Research and 
Education (NAPARE) statistics). 
160 See supra text accompanying notes 151-59. 
161 AIDS is considered a communicable disease, but it: is not easily transmitted. See Richard 
Green, The Transmission of AIDS, in AIDS AND THE LAw: A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 28, 28 (Harlon 
L. Dalton ed., 1987) (noting that AIDS cannot be spread by casual contact). 
162 Kass, supra note 13, at 310. 
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a. Compelling state interests are not furthered 
A state may offer many laudable motives for screening for 
HIV / AIDS and prosecuting HIV-infected women who become preg-
nant. These motives would likely include halting the spread of AIDS, 163 
preserving fetal and family health l 64and cutting costs and saving re-
sources. 165 
Although all of these reasons may be compelling governmental 
interests, there is little evidence that prosecuting women with 
HIV / AIDS for having children will further any of them, or that prose-
cutions would accomplish the goals less restrictively than other possible 
means. First, these prosecutions would not have much effect on cur-
tailing AIDS because there is still no way to prevent the transfer of HIV 
perinatally; women already pregnant cannot help but expose their 
fetuses to HIV.I66 Therefore, unless abortion is encouraged or re-
163 See Banks, supra note 8, at 377 ("[T]he state arguably has a compelling interest in 
preventing the spread of a mildly contagious, but often fatal, disease, HIV, especially when the 
possible target of infection is a newborn child."); Isaacman, supra note 9, at 490 ("Combating a 
public health problem is a legitimate health and welfare power of the state, and AIDS is a public 
health problem of monumental concern and proportion.") (citation omitted). 
164 See, e.g., Nancy Hutton & Lawrence S. Wissow, Maternal and Newbam HIV Screening: 
Implications f(ff Children and Families, in NEXT GENERATION, supra note 10, at 105, 116 ("Early 
diagnosis of HIV infection permits more prompt and focused management of the immu-
nodeficient child, including specific antiretroviral therapy, and thus holds the promise of both 
extending and improving the child's quality of life."); see also Isaacman, supra note 9, at 490 
(analyzing whether Illinois's HIV transmission statute, as applied to pregnant women with HIV, 
promotes family health); if. Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Crimi-
nalization of "Fetal Abuse," 101 HARV. L. REv. 994, 1003-05 (1988) (discussing the state's interest 
in protecting fetuses from the risk of miscarriage, stillbirth, birth defects, and other fetal injuries, 
as a result of "fetal abuse"). 
A state's interest in protecting "family health" may also include a desire to prevent children's 
having to grow up without their mothers (who will presumably die of AIDS). See Hutton & Wissow, 
supra, at 114 (reporting estimates that by 1995, in New York City alone, approximately 20,000 
children will be orphaned because of parents dying of AIDS). 
165 Some argue that the medical and foster care costs of HIV-infected children are likely to 
approach or even exceed that of drug-addicted infants, unless the birth rate of children with 
HIV / AIDS is checked. Others have expressed concern that infants exposed to HIV and infants 
exposed to drugs might end up "competing" for the same resources. Hutton & Wissow, supra 
note 164, at 114. Some commentators believe that these costs are a strong reason why women 
with HIV should be discouraged from having children. 
The possibility of a drain on available resources is also a concern, as state welfare agencies 
wonder how they will handle an expected flood of infants, many of whom will be without parents 
or with terminal illnesses. See, e.g., Cheryl Laird, The New Orphans: When AIDS Claims Parents, 
What Happens to the Children?, HOUSTON CHRON., October 4,1992, at 1 (discussing the already 
overburdened child welfare systems in many states, and the tremendous costs that AIDS will 
precipitate in the coming years). 
166Ruth R. Faden & Judith Areen, Screening Newblffns for HIV: Ethical and Legal Aspects, in 
NEXT GENERATION, supra note 10, at 259, 267. As mentioned above, however, not all babies will 
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quired,167 HIV transfer will still occur.168 It may be argued that these 
prosecutions serve a deterrent purpose: that these women and others 
like them will try harder to avoid pregnancy in the future. It is more 
likely, however, that the prosecutions will deter women from seeking 
care and treatment before, during, and after childbirth in order to 
avoid the punishment.169 
Second, it is unlikely that fetal and family health would be fur-
thered much, if at all, by prosecuting parenting women with 
HIV / AIDS. As mentioned above, the threat of prosecution likely will 
deter pregnant women from seeking prenatal care, and may cause 
them to deliver their babies at home to prevent discovery.l70 Further, 
many of the particulars of perinatal HIV transmission are unknown, 
including when the transmission takes place, why some infants form 
their own seropositivity while most do not, and what effects the preg-
nancy will have on the mother's health. l7l What is known is that at the 
moment, there are no cures or long-term effective treatments for 
HIV / AIDS.172 Although voluntary educational, testing, and treatment 
remain infected: somewhere from 60 to 93% of babies born to women with HlV / AIDS will 
develop in full health. See supra note 44. 
167 See, e.g., infra note 174. 
168 It may be worth noting that "[tlransmission of the infection from infants to others has 
rarely been demonstrated." Faden & Areen, supra note 166, at 267. Thus, even if a small 
percentage of babies becomes HlV infected, AIDS will not be spread beyond those infants. 
169 Banks, supra note 8, at 370-72 & n.98 (citing Patton, Resistance and the Erotic: Reclaiming 
History, Setting Strategy as We Face AIDS, RADICAL AM., 68, 78 (Nov.-Dec. 1986) (stating that 
former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop does not advocate mandatory prenatal HlV screening 
because he fears it would discourage prenatal care»; cfJohnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (1992) 
(refusing to apply statute proscribing delivery of drugs to minors to woman who passed drugs 
through her umbilical cord to her newborn, because of the fear that it would dissuade women 
from seeking prenatal care). The court in Johnson noted that: 
[Plrosecuting women for using drugs and "delivering" them to their newborns 
appears to be the least effective response to this crisis. Rather than face the possi-
bility of prosecution, pregnant women who are substance abusers may simply avoid 
prenatal or medical care for fear of being detected. Yet the newborns of these 
women are, as a group, the most fragile and sick, and most in need of hospital 
neonatal care. A decision to deliver these babies "at-home" will have tragic and 
serious consequences. 
Id. (adopting the dissenting opinion of the court below). This view has also been asserted by the 
American Medical Association Board of Trustees, the California Medical Association, and numer-
ous others in the medical community. Id. 
170 See CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE LAW AND POLICY, supra note 37, at 3 (also stating that 
public health groups and policy makers are in wide agreement that punitive measures do not 
improve the health of women or their children). 
171 Modlin & Saah, supra note 13, at 39-40; John T. Repke & Timothy R.B. Johnson, HlV 
Infection and Obstetric Care, in NEXT GENERATION, supra note 10, at 94, 94-98; Kass, supra note 
13, at 311. 
172 Allen, supra note 131, at 187-88. 
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programs should be made widely available, a compulsory testing pro-
gram is not appropriate until advances are made in "test specificity, 
pre symptomatic treatment, and social safeguards. "173 
Prosecutions of HIV-infected women are more likely to encourage 
fetal death in the form of abortions than to further any governmental 
interest in protecting fetal health. 174 In addition to antiabortionists' 
traditional objections to such encouragement of abortion,175 there is 
also a question as to the legal and moral authority of a court or state 
to favor death over disability. For example, courts have refused to 
recognize parents' "wrongful life" claims against doctors for inade-
quately performing sterilizations that resulted in unplanned pregnan-
cies and children born with disabilities.176 Courts have based these 
refusals on the assertion that there is no foundation in the law that 
enables judges to decide that "it is better to have never been born at 
all rather than to have been born with serious ... defects .... "177 
Yet, in the case of perinatal HIV transfer prosecutions, the legis-
latures and courts would be saying just that: it is better not to have a 
child at all than to have a child who may develop AIDS. In addition to 
the lack of legal support for preferring death to disability, the lack of 
moral authority should also prevent a state from making this choice: 
Preventing the birth of a child who would have an illness or 
a disability is morally different from preventing illness or 
disability in persons already living .... [Treating them as the 
same] involves a morally unacceptable view of the social 
worth of such persons. A public policy aimed at discouraging 
persons with inheritable disabilities or illnesses from having 
children embodies highly objectionable social affirmations of 
173Hutton & Wissow, supra note 164, at 116; Faden et al., HN Infectian, Pregnant Women, 
and Newborns; A Policy Proposal for Information and Testing, in NEXT GENERATION, supra note 10, 
at 331, also published in 264JAMA 2416 (1990). 
1741f a pregnant woman knows or suspects she is seropositive or has AIDS/ARC, she may 
seek an abortion in order to avoid being discovered and prosecuted. Thus, the government would 
in effect encourage certain death for an infant rather than a 60 to 93 percent chance of healthy 
life. See Isaacman, supra note 9, at 491 (asserting that Illinois's HIV transmission statute encour-
ages abortion because it is the only way for the pregnant seropositive woman to avoid breaking 
the law); see also Note, supra note 164, at 1003 n.55 (arguing that perhaps the governmental 
"interest in prohibiting abortions is greater than the state's interest in preventing fetal abuse 
because nonexistence may be a greater harm than mere injury"). 
175For example, that abortion is murder, the killing of potential life. 
176Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 485 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Elliott 
v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978). 
177 Curlender, 165 Cal. Rptr at 485; see also Elliott, 361 So. 2d at 548 ("Upon what legal 
foundation is the court to determine that it is better not to have been born than to be born with 
deformities?"). 
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individual inequality. First, it denies that such persons have 
an equal right to participate in a highly valued aspect of the 
human experience-the begetting and raising of children. 
Second, it says to disabled and ill persons generally that the 
lives of some are not worth living, and hence that these 
persons are not entitled to a share of the social resources 
necessary for human flourishing. Third, it conveys the mes-
sage that persons with a disability or an illness are to be 
understood as only an economic and social drain on society 
and never as a source of enrichment for the lives of others.178 
Perinatal HIV prosecutions do not encourage family health. As 
mentioned above, it is not healthy for a mother to avoid care and 
treatment relating to her pregnancy (or to her HIV / AIDS), which she 
is likely to do if she fears detection and prosecution. Further, these 
prosecutions could lead to the imprisonment of mothers or placement 
of children in temporary or permanent foster care, both of which 
remove an infant from a presumably caring and able parent. Punitive 
fines will also only result in hurting members of the family, who prob-
ably are already hard-pressed to cope with their illnesses. 
Lastly, there is also no proof that the statutory prosecution of 
childbearing women with HIV / AIDS will prevent rising foster care and 
welfare costs. As mentioned above, it is unclear that these statutes will 
actually discourage HIV-infected women from having children; AIDS-
related costs may therefore remain the same. In addition, the prose-
cutions themselves and their associated court expenses will require 
additional funds, as will any imprisonment or supplemental foster care 
costs. 
b. The application of these statutes in this situation is not the least 
restrictive means for achieving governmental objectives 
Compounding the constitutional problems stemming from the 
lack of evidence that compelling state interests will be furthered, the 
terms of these measures are unnecessarily broad. The extension of 
child abuse, child neglect and HIV transmission statutes to perinatal 
HIV transmission is likely to impact decisions made by women in three 
settings: decisions by all women whether or not to be tested for 
HIV / AIDS; decisions by HIV-infected women or women in higher risk 
groups whether or not to become pregnant; and decisions made by 
178 Faden et aI., supra note 173, at 338-39. 
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pregnant HN-infected women or women in higher-risk groups after 
becoming pregnant whether to carry the pregnancy to term.179 Al-
though only a very small percentage of women are HN infected, 
millions would be affected by prenatal screenings.180 Furthermore, the 
potential screenings and prosecutions would affect countless other 
women in deciding whether to be tested for HN (if knowledge ofHN 
status was an element of the offense) and whether to become pregnant. 
Some people have argued that screening for HN / AIDS should be 
targeted so that it is required only of high-risk groups. This suggestion 
has elicited concerns of genocide and racism similar to those evoked 
by the mandatory screening for sickle-cell anemia two decades ago181 
because of the disproportionate effect AIDS has had on women of 
color.182 Seventy-five percent of women with AIDS are African American 
or Latina.183 Furthermore, 69% of women with AIDS are either injec-
tion drug users or sex partners of injection drug users,184 and about 
179 See Kass, supra note 13, at 308-24 (recommending appropriate nondirective counseling 
for women in these three stages). The decisionmaking issue inevitably involves questions about 
the type of counseling prescribed (i.e., directive or nondirective). There is a good deal of 
disagreement over the role of the doctor, clinician or counselor: should he or she advise or 
encourage patients to follow a particular course of action (i.e., an abortion following positive HIV 
tests), or should he or she simply inform and educate patients to enable them to make their own 
decisions in light of their particular circumstances? 
This issue is beyond the scope of this article. For a comprehensive discussion of the numerous 
factors involved in screening and counseling, see NEXT GENERATION, supra note 10, passim; 
Banks, supra note 8, passim; see also Faden et aI., supra note 173, at 331 (discussing the countless 
moral, legal, and policy issues involved in screening and counseling, and advocating widespread 
education and voluntary testing rather than mandatory screening and directive counseling). 
180 The number of births recorded in the United States in 1989 was 4,040,958. WOMEN'S 
HEALTH DATA BOOK 1 (Jacqueline A. Horton ed., 1992). For a discussion of the overbreadth of 
coercive prenatal HIV testing, see Allen, supra note 131, at 172. 
For the most part, pregnant women are not HIV infected, do not have AIDS or 
ARC, and do not fit into any high-risk category. To impose testing nonetheless on 
all pregnant women would appear to be irrational in economic cost-benefit terms 
and would "burden some who are not similarly situated with regard to the purposes" 
ofHIV testing. The governmentally imposed burden of these women would involve 
more than a needle puncture. It would include lost autonomy, false positives, false 
negatives and consequent stigma, personal turmoil, or unnecessary abortion. 
Id. (quoting from LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1450 (2d ed. 1988». 
181 See supra notes 146--48 and accompanying text. 
182 See, e.g., Banks, supra note 8, at 354 ("Given the racial composition of the women currently 
thought to be at risk, HIV screening and counseling proposals designed to somehow prevent 
perinatal transmission have genocidal overtones."). 
183 E.G. Bing & TA. Soto, Treatment Issues for African Americans and Hispanics with AIDS, 9 
PSYCHIATRIC MED. 455 (1991). As of June 1993, there were 19,544 cases of African-American 
women with AIDS and 7451 cases of Hispanic-American women with AIDS, out ofa total of 36,960 
American women with AIDS. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 154, at 8. These figures 
add up to approximately 74%. 
184CENTERS FOR DISEASE CoNTROL, supra note 154, at 8. 
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78% of these women are also Mrican American or Latina.18s These 
disproportionate statistics are not caused by biological differences 
among ethnicities; they reflect only sociodemographic differences. 186 
Directed screening based on such sociodemographic criteria would be 
"invidiously discriminatory on its face. "187 
Even if all pregnant women are tested for HIV, mandatory pro-
grams will still be subject to questions of racial genocide and eugenics 
because of the dramatically disproportionate impact such testing will 
have on families of color.188 There have been few legislative attempts 
to proscribe pregnancy among women with particular diseases, espe-
cially when the disease has affected nonminority populations.189 This 
makes the reproductive control of women with HIV susceptible to 
charges of racial animus because many diseases are more prevalent 
than HIV / AIDS.190 An example is cystic fibrosis, a disease that primarily 
affects nonminorities. Though more prevalent than HIV / AIDS, cystic 
fibrosis has not incited a drive for mandatory screening or punitive 
measures for bearing affected children.191 
The application of these criminal statutes to all HIV-infected 
women would also be overbroad because of the lack of knowledge of 
the likelihood and means of vertical HIV infection. 192 On the other 
hand, it makes little sense to prosecute only those women whose babies 
happen to be infected if states wished to punish those who even take 
the risk. The issues involving knowledge and intent, discussed above, 
complicate attempts to enact a logical, uniformly applied statute.193 
185 Id. 
186 Faden et aI., supra note 173, at 343-44. 
187Id. at 343. 
188 See, e.g., Kass, supra note 13, at 320 ("If some people believe that these [minority] women 
should not be having babies or more babies anyway, HlV poses the perfect excuse for legitimately 
encouraging them not to do so."). 
189 Id. at 320. 
190 Id. 
191Id. 
192 Although most babies born to mothers with HlV / AIDS will initially test seropositive, the 
majority of these babies will "lose" their seropositivity over the first two years of life. As noted, 
studies have shown that somewhere between 7 and 40% of these babies will retain their HlV-posi-
tive status. See supra note 44. It is not known why some babies retain the infection and others do 
not. However, several researchers who have found incidence on the lower end of the spectrum 
have emphasized the importance of not making HlV status judgments before the baby is at least 
eighteen months old. See Melchor et aI., supra note 44, at 534. According to these studies, many 
babies exhibit seropositivity before the IS-month point but later "lose" that status. Id. 
193 For example, what would be the response to women who do not intend or want to get 
pregnant, who become seropositive after becoming pregnant, or who did not know they were 
HlV infected when they became pregnant? Further, what is the appropriate measure for a woman 
who knew she was HlV infected and became pregnant intentionally but miscarried her baby? 
Should she be prosecuted because she might have borne an infant with HlV? 
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Until more is known about the incidence of perinatal transmission, no 
far-reaching measures should be taken against pregnant women. 
In addition, the argument that children should not have to be 
born to mothers who are going to die soon is paternalistic and facile. 
Many people with HIV have remained healthy for a decade or longer 
before becoming ill with AIDS.194 There is even recent evidence that 
5% of seropositive individuals may have some type of natural immunity 
to AIDS.195 It seems logical that in order to justify the taking of an 
individual's reproductive control, a state would need to prove that the 
individual lacked some requisite degree of capacity or ability to par-
ent. 196 A probability of death within ten or more years does not repre-
sent such an inability or incapacity per se. If it did, countless people, 
including the older population and others afflicted with illness, might 
also be stripped of their reproductive rights. 
As demonstrated, statutes aimed at the screening, prosecution, 
and punishment of childbearing women with HIV / AIDS do not meet 
the requirements of strict scrutiny. These statutes would not promote 
compelling state interests in the least restrictive manner. As a result, 
women's fundamental rights must be guarded, and women must not 
be screened, prosecuted, or punished for the perinatal transfer of HIV. 
B. The Fourth Amendment Right to Bodily Integrity 
The need for HIV testing in order to accomplish the above-men-
tioned statutory goals also invokes the Fourth Amendment, which 
grants individuals "[t]he right to be secure in their persons .... "197 This 
right has been interpreted as preventing unjustifiable invasions of the 
body or person.198 The question then arises whether a compulsory 
194 See, e.g., Laurie Garrett, Why Some Survive, NEWSDAY, June 15, 1993, at 59 (recounting a 
study by Dr. Renate Baumgarten of Ulm University Hospital in Germany of 25 gay men and 20 
intravenous drug users who had all lived with HlV infection for more than 12 years without 
becoming ill); Erik Kirschbaum, Scientists Drawn to Mystery of Long Survival with AIDS Virus, 
REUTER LIBR. REp., June 7, 1993 (citing studies of a group of 593 men with HlV, indicating that 
12% exhibited full-blown AIDS within 5 years, 51 % within 10 years, and 68% within 13.8 years). 
195 See Christine Gorman, Are Some Peaple Immune to AIDS?, TIME, March 22, 1993, at 49 
(reporting that there are at least 70 documented cases of individuals who have lived for 14 or 
more years with an HlV-positive diagnosis, without experiencing any symptoms of AIDS). 
196There is currently much discussion concerning the guardianship rights of parents with 
HlV / AIDS and their ability to plan immediate guardianship placements for their children upon 
the parents' incapacity. See infra notes 214-17 and accompanying text. 
197U.S. CONST. amend. lV. 
198 This doctrine has for the most part grown out of decisions involving searches and seizures 
in the criminal context, and has been extended to situations involving personal privacy. See, e.g., 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) ("[T]he right to be secure against rude invasions of 
privacy by state officers is ... constitutional in origin."); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 
630-32 (1886) ("[I]t is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that 
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blood test for pregnant women is an unjustifiable invasion by the 
state.199 
The general rule utilized to determine whether the Fourth 
Amendment is triggered was developed in Katz v. United Statef200 and 
its progeny. It involves two questions: does the individual at issue have 
an expectation of privacy in this context, and is that expectation of 
privacy reasonable?201 Clearly, a woman has an expectation of privacy 
in her body. This leaves the question of whether her expectation is 
reasonable in the context of pregnancy and her HIV infection. 
As mentioned above, the government has on many occasions 
justified invasions of the body on the basis of protecting public 
health.202 Perinatal HIV transmission, however, carries less risk than 
other diseases for which compulsory programs have been designed, 
and additional justification is therefore needed before Fourth Amend-
ment interests can be infringed upon. 
The Supreme Court has on several occasions confronted the ques-
tion of whether forced blood tests were violative of the Fourth Amend-
ment. In Schmerber v. California203 and Breithaupt v. Abram,204 the Su-
preme Court held that blood alcohol tests performed without a 
warrant or consent did not violate the Fourth Amendment.205 In each 
constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal 
security, personal liberty and private property ... [that] is contrary to the principles of a free 
government ... [and] is abhorrent to the instincts of an American .... "). 
Justice Brandeis's famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States underscores this point 
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the 
pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of 
his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure 
and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect 
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They 
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most compre-
hensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man. 
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,]., dissenting), quoted in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 
564 (1969). 
199 A comprehensive discussion of the conflict between HlV testing and the Fourth Amend-
ment right to privacy is beyond the scope of this article. I include here a only a short discussion 
of the issues involved. 
For a decision indicating that nonconsensual HlV tests may not be justified without a warrant 
or exigent circumstances, see Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1991). 
200389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
201Id. at 361--62 (1967) (Harlan,]., concurring). 
202 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
203 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
204 352 U.S. 432 (1957). 
205 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767-68 (holding that a blood alcohol test constituted a search, 
but that it was permissible under the circumstances); Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 439 (finding that a 
blood alcohol test of an unconscious person admitted to the hospital reeking of alcohol was 
acceptable and admissible). 
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of those cases, however, the Court recognized that there was some form 
of probable cause or exigent circumstances that justified the inva-
sion.206 This requirement for individualized suspicion or cause was 
buttressed by the holding in Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy.207The 
court in Suscy held that bus drivers had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their blood or urine, because drug and alcohol-related tests 
were performed only if the specific individual had been involved in an 
accident or if the Transit Authority suspected that the specific individ-
ual was under the influence of drugs or alcohol during work.208 
There is no probable cause, individualized suspicion, or exigent 
circumstance that justifies testing every pregnant woman for HIV. 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, although the risks associated with 
perinatal HIV transmission are terrible, they are currently incurable, 
and thus cannot justifY the invasion of a woman's right to privacy. 
Mandatory screening of all pregnant women for HIV would therefore 
violate women's Fourth Amendment rights and cannot be supported. 
C. Alternatives to Punitive Measures 
There are other means by which states could protect their interests 
in preventing the spread of AIDS, promoting family and fetal health, 
and diminishing the costs of AIDS. These means would not only be 
less restrictive of fundamental rights, but would also be more effective 
in accomplishing those goals. First, widespread voluntary educational, 
testing, and support systems should be set up so that women could 
learn more about HIV / AIDS and could be tested if they chose. Women 
testing positive should be informed about and assisted with the possible 
consequences of being infected with HIV. There is no proof that 
voluntary systems have been less effective than compulsory ones; in 
206 See Sehmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70 (holding that when there is probable cause and exigent 
circumstances (as is the case with blood alcohol levels, which decrease over time), an invasion 
such as a blood alcohol test may be performed without a search warrant); Breithaup~ 352 U.S. at 
439 (holding that the blood alcohol test on the unconscious defendant was not unreasonable 
because there was probable cause: officers noticed that the defendant's breath reeked of alcohol 
after he was involved in an automobile crash). 
207 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.) , eert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976). 
208 Sus!)" 538 F.2d at 1267. But see Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1143 (3d Cir.), eert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986) (holding that random breathalyzer and urine tests performed by the 
New Jersey Racing Commission on jockeys were permissible, despite the fact that they constituted 
searches). The Shoemaker court held, however, that for random searches to be justified, there 
must be a "strong state interest in conducting an unannounced search," and "the pervasive 
regulation of the industry must have reduced the justifiable privacy expectation of the subject of 
the search." Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142. Because these conditions are not satisfied in the case 
ofHlV tests for all pregnant women, testing is not justified. 
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fact, looking back on lessons learned from Tay-Sachs disease and sickle-
cell anemia, voluntary programs may be more effective under these 
circumstances. With preventative education and knowledge of the pos-
sibilities of transmission to a child, a woman with HIV / AIDS can weigh 
her options and decide whether the risks are too great.209 With ade-
quate support, a woman would seek care and treatment for herself and 
her child, rather than isolating herself out of fear that discovery of her 
condition would bring harmful legal or medical consequences. 
The concern that a mother with HIV / AIDS might not be able to 
care for her children or might become unable to do so because of her 
own illness is also remediable in a less restrictive way. Before a state 
can deny an individual's reproductive autonomy, the state should have 
a clear sense of the minimum physical and mental capacity that an 
individual should have in order to parent.210 On ora O'Neill has stated 
that an appropriate minimum standard for procreative autonomy may 
be "the ability to take care of the child or to transfer the obligation to one 
who can fuifill it."211 It seems apparent that not all women with 
HIV / AIDS would be found to lack that capacity. 
Under [Onora O'Neill's] formulation, a person utterly inca-
pable of fulfilling rearing responsibilities would still have a 
right to bear and beget as long as there were a reasonable 
likelihood that he or she could transfer parental obligations 
to one who was fit to rear the child.212 
Under this standard, the state could insure that a child would not 
be left without any care,213 but a woman's right to procreate would 
remain intact. 
Several states are legislating or considering means by which par-
ents with HIV / AIDS could remain parents while capable, but ensure 
209 The issue of whether federal funding should be made available to women who would 
choose to abort their fetus, but cannot afford to, is beyond the scope of this article. 
210 Robertson, supra note 115, at 411. Further, "[l]ack of physical capacity alone should not 
disquality a person from exercising procreative choice." Id. 
2ll Id. at 411 (citing Onora O'Neill, Begetting, Bearing and Rearing, in HAVING CHILDREN: 
PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL REFLECTIONS ON PARENTHOOD 25 (1979)) (emphasis added). 
212Id. at 412. 
213Professor Robertson has also asserted that under O'Neill's formulation, even persons 
incapable of specifically designating other caretakers retain the right to reproduce. !d. He relies 
on the fact that the United States has in place social mechanisms for transferring parental 
responsibilities when a child is in need (i.e., guardian and foster care systems). Id. Robertson 
states that these social arrangements fulfill O'Neill's second condition of reasonable likelihood 
of transferring parental responsibilities. Id. 
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that their children would have appropriate guardians immediately 
upon their incapacity.214 Under most current laws, parents can leave 
guardianship provisions in their wills, but these appointments are 
subject to lengthy review processes.215 Children might therefore be left 
for several weeks or months without a guardian trusted and desired by 
the natural parent. Under standby guardianship provisions, parents 
with HIV / AIDS can nominate a guardian for their children and pro-
ceed with the approval process while they are still capable.216 If a 
standby guardian is approved, the parent with HIV / AIDS may care for 
her children while she is able, while ensuring that her children will not 
be left alone upon her death or incapacity.217 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For too long, women have been subject to procedures and pun-
ishments in the name of protecting the potential for life within them. 
Decisions about whether to conceive, and whether to carry a preg-
nancy to term, can and should be left to the mother whenever possible. 
Such a conclusion only makes sense, considering that any action taken 
in the name of the fetus invariably involves the mother. 
Women with HIV / AIDS are especially vulnerable to state repro-
ductive control because they have the potential to bear "defective" 
offspring. As demonstrated, however, women's constitutional rights of 
liberty and privacy protect them from compulsory screening and prose-
cution for perinatal transmission of HIV. Such prosecutions would 
neither accomplish any legitimate governmental goals nor effectuate 
any rational public policy. In fact, these programs would result in clear 
harms and little, if any, benefit. For these reasons, states should not 
attempt to screen pregnant women for HIV, or extend child abuse, 
214 See In re Estate of Two Minors, No. 1-93-1067, 1993 Ill. App. LEXIS 1498, at *7 (Ill. App. 
Ct. Sept 30, 1993) (reversing refusal to grant standby guardianship and remanding for consid-
eration in light of Illinois legislature's amendment of Probate Act to establish standby guardian-
ship measures); see also Laura Duncan, Standby-Guardian Ruling is Source of Hope for Parents, 
Advocates, CHI. DAILY LAw BULL., Sept. 27, 1993, at 1. New York and florida also permit standby 
guardian appointments. David Bailey, Appeal of Standby Guardian Ruling Mooted, CHI. DAILY LAw 
BULL., Feb. 2, 1993, at 1. 
215 See Laura Duncan, Court Urged to Approve Standby Guardians for Children of AIDS, CHI. 
DAILY LAW BULL., May 10, 1993, at 1 (discussing the current state of probate law in Illinois). 
Under the current system, parents with HIV / AIDS can also appoint a guardian for their children 
while they are still alive. Id. However, if the guardianship is granted, the parents must relinquish 
their own guardianship rights immediately, even if they are still capable. Id. 
216Bailey, supra note 214. 
217Duncan, supra note 214. 
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child neglect, or HIV transmission statutes to pregnant seropositive 
women. Instead, the government should work to accomplish the goals 
of fighting AIDS and promoting fetal and family health by offering 
voluntary educational, screening, and support programs; conducting 
more outreach into overlooked communities; and devoting more 
funds to the development of effective AIDS drugs and vaccines. 
